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I.

RITi'liiI.s_Of.ficial Career_ana_Posit.ioa._.,
An outiine-autobiograjjhy or rhe aefe.idant Karl RITTRR

exists in the iorm oi his arfidavit, Prosecution "iJxhibit 8,
RG-35^9 (Pros, Doc, Book 1, Rngi. p. 3i)«

He was born in

Bavd^ia in 1883, studiea iavtf at the Universities of Munich,
Berxin and "^rlaagen, graauated as a Doctor of Lavj from the
University of "3rlangsn, worked for two years as an eaitor
in the i;conomic Sectioi. of a German newspaper, then for five
years in the Bavarian Civil Service, and thereupon began a
career of great variety in the Reich Civil Service.
>

Until 1911, he worked on economic problems in the Reich
Colonial Ofiica at Berlin, and until 1914 as economic expert
in the administration of the then German colony Cameroon,

Africa,

After Vi/orld War I he served in the Reich Economic

Office and "in the Reich Ministry ox Finance.

1

RlTT'iR began his career in the German Foreign Office in
1922, as a Senior Legation Councillor,

He became Minister

Ist Class, suosequently Plinisuerial Director with the scope
"f"

of respoiisiuility of the one xime Staue Secretary of Economy.

FiA.aj.iy he became the top expert of the Foreign Office on

reparation proolams.

In 1929, he became Chief of the newly

estaoiishad Gco:iomic-?olitical Department of the Foreign
Office.

V/hen uhe Furope Committee of the League of /Nations

was establishea, RITTUR represe-itad Germany in it, and when

a French-German Committee was set up, ha became its Secretary

General.

• nnA' W.

t

RIITGR states in his affidavit that up to 1933 He

"took part in a close and authoritative vi/ay in all general

♦

foreign .policy problems."

In 1937, under the Hitler regime, RITTRR became German

Ambassador to Brazil,

In Fall of 193^? He was racalleci to

the "Wilhelmstrasse" in Berlin.
•' '•' '

W; .,jy, •

Ha received the title

"Ambassador for Special Assignments" in 1939? Hut was
assi^ed to special missions alraaay oefur-e the war. By his

'•f

parformanea of vnosa missions he gained the confidence of
Ribuentrop and other Nazi leaders,
- 1— .

In or aoout Novembar 1933i he- bacama the Chxaf of a
Gernian-Czach Commission.

Its purpose is besoribeb ir.. his

affidavit euphemisticallyxas that of "settling of economic
problems incidental to the transfer of the Sudetenland to

the German administration."

Another and avan more important

special mission which he receivad in March 1939, after the
Gorman occupation of Prague, will ba shown in a saction of
this brief dealing with RITT'^K's rola in tha saizura of
Czechoslovakia.

Contrary to tha stataments of tha defansa, RITT^R's

positions unaar Ribbantrop were avan mora important than thosa
he held before, as can ba seen from the tramandous increase

in his salary,

Ministry Director ha had RM 281OO, as Am

bassador in tha Third Reich RM 46600.

(Prosecution ^xie. 0-301,

NG-4150, Doc. B. 74-A, Sngl. p. 99).

His functions in tha Forsign Oifica subsaquant to his
appointment, in 1939? as Ambassador for Special Missions, are
thus dascribad in his own affidavit.

(Prosacution '^xh. 8,

HG-35S9) paragraphs 21,.22)s
"After tha outbreak of War, I was appointed
ambassador for special missions.
In this capacity

I was subordinatad to Ribbantrop alone, I could
receive orders from him alone, and was not concerned
with the currant business routine of tha Foreign

Office.

My first special mission was to raprssant

tha Foreign office in a Commission for Economic Warfaro formad under the chairmanship of an admiral. My
sacond mission was to concluda an economic treaty
with Russia.
This mission required my services up
to late Fall 1940.

"In October 1940

-1/ I was appointed liaison man

batwean Riobantrop and Kaitel. This function X held
np to Fail 1944, after which time I did not gat any

more assignments, nor did I set foot into the Foreign
Office any more, except when I was called there."
Considaring his own admissions, obviously concealing the
truth revealed by other sources, the fact remains mat at
least since I937 RITTCR was one of the top men in r^zi-Germany's

Foreign Service and in this capacity in charge of political
and economic-political assigni'uonts.
1/

For the correction of th? data "Spring of 1941", contained
in the original text of tha affidavit to "October I94O",
sae RITTFR's testimony on direct (Transcript paga II77O).
-
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Thus9 HITT^ hald a high civil and political position
in Nazi Germany.

In accordanca with tha principla of indi

vidual rasponsioility5 ha can, tharofora, ba charged, both
lagally and atnicallyj with a substantial share in Garmany's

^Sb^'^ssive war guilt.

A nation cannot axist, think or act

but througxi individuals.

Unless wa subscribe to tha prepos—

tarous proposition that a crime should not ba atoned ^or if

it was committed by a state, those must atone for a nation's

crime who held prominent positions in agencies involved in
their planning or execution.

Hitler's tv/o main agencies in his aggressive war plannings and actions were the Army High Coriimand in charge of
the military9 and the Foreign Office in charge of the diplo
matic phases of those crimes.

i

RITTUR held a prominent posi

tion, with many discretionary funccions within the Foreign
Office. This important position was raised to an even higher
lavel through t
his assigruuent as the top liaison man

between the two above-mentioned agencies. Any unbiased ap
praisal of the pertinent evidence, shows him iii the role of
policy maker coordinating the aggressive war activities of
the Foreign Oifice and the OKW>

- 3 -

in_the_lTazi R^g.im3_i
The defendant RITTIJl did not belong to Hitler's Old
Guard•

He was one of those neophytes v;ho on account of their

background could have been expected to stir up or join active

opposition against Hitler's gangster regime.

Like many of

his kind, he was guided by opportunism rather than by moral
scruples in his attituae to the Hitler Government.

He readily

supported, by his actions, a system which probably might have

been repellent to his feelings in the beginning,

nevertheless,

he did not hesitate to profit from it oy official position
and high salary at a later time.

It is well to quote, in

this connoction, from Hans Rothfels' "The German Opposition

to Hitler" (Chicago, 111., I948), p. 29s
"Many observers hold the view that without

j'

the cooperation and competence 01 civil servants,
managers, and other tr..ined persoimei, the ITazi ad
ministration and economy Vv'ould ia ve broken down in

an early stage. And, in particular, the technocrats
and experts, with their aostract love for exficiancy,
duly come in ior a large share of blame."
^ven from the strongly colored account of the defendant

himself, it appears that it was not compulsion, but free

choicG, based on opportunistic motives, which m-.de him join

the Nazi Party in 193^ while he was German Ambassador to
Brazil,

We quote from his examination on directs

"In 1938 I received a latter and with the same
mail my legation secretary received a letter with the

same wording, which included the phrase that the Party
would welcome i t i f the tvjo

of us could decide to

become members. This letter came as a complete sur
prise to me in the same wa.y that it came ..
-t-;
as a complete surprise to my couiiselor of legation. 1

must say it was not a pleas at surprise oecause we faced

two altarautives, both unpleasant. If we refused the
invitaxion to join the Party, it ^.'ould mean, first of
all, for both-of us, that we persuxially vvoula have to
go into a so-called voluntary emigration, because it
vi/as obvious that after turning down such an invitsition
we could not return to Germany, quite apart from the
fact, of course, that we would iiave been recaxled from
our posts immediately. In addition, in such an exposed
place as Rio., there would have been a very unpleasant

incident and gossip, political gossip, which we v/anted

to avoid.

So the two of us filled in the form v;hich

was included in the letter, and we sent it oxf to the

address which was mentioned.
-

4

Today I can't remember
-

A:,/.;.-

the wording oi that form, and I don't know whathar
it v;ns an application for mambarship or whethar it
•was only a form for.filling in parsonal data. Kaithar
do I ramambar that I mada any dafinita assarancas and

promlsas. I considarad it a pura forrmality for mysalf
as watl^as for uha Party
My contact with tha Party
was limitad during tha following yaars to a paid amount

of 200 marks as my mambarship faa in January or ovary
yaar. This brought ma oack a racaipt by tha Party,

and.that is all tha ousinass I avar had with tha P^rtv "
(Transcript pagas II756, 11757).
Upon tha following lurthar question of his dafansa
counsels

"So, if I undarstand you corractly, Harr RITTm

you did not think_that by gatting party mambarship you

wara rooilly also in agraarnant with Hitlar's Party
program.",

he answarad;

"It may ba that thara was such a santanca to that
oiiact
on . tha
form Ia. racaivad
and signod. 1I don't
„
,
,
X v, ^ X V y..u ,.iiu oigriau.
Qon't
r.,momb3r It now. But I don't thirtk I avar raad tha
T* .-3 m ,-5 m n-i r«

t+

t-l-.o.

^

^

.

Pp.rty progrcm.

P ^ -yy suocoad in rerding Hitlar's 'Main
rao^c! ' a
got
stuck
thirtyproraally
tallaftar
you tha
what lirst
tha Party

grc;m was."

(Transcript paga I1757),

It will not ba difficult for tnj Tribunal to saparata
truth and fiction in thasa statamants of RITT'SR. Ha cams'
closer to tha truth in a prior part of his diract axamina-

ticn in doscri'Ding his attituda with ragard to Hitlar's accass
to povi-ar. Tna admission of opportunism as tha main motiva
of making a choice contrary to his i.mar conviction is tha
r..d lina running through both of those statamants. V/ith

ragard to the second-mantlonad subject-mattar, ha says;
ovar

>

I did not -xl^itlh-'t
so. And thf^

surprisad when Hitlar took •

U"

January, 1933,

th.t he v;ould ever Sncca-ad in doing

an indithon ? ^ consider as a sign and
standlnf
Th^^d ? int.^rior policy,
interestif and
undfryaars in
in previous

lists disoasfi.a

friands^and journa-

tho Dositinn 5h +vI

in their faces.

SimiUir was

of the Foraicrn nfflcf^Ul®
officials
plpt^lv iinovnn^? A •
ware all faced with a comcounled mor^ofi'h
situation. I really had

and T

i-v +

sense of tha German people,

neeauive -ttitnH + ^^sich President Hindenburg, whose

n^v^r

Hitler i already knew, would

x'ui.,ign Oiiica in tne circle vdiicn I

'

5

Just mantionad, tharo wara soma paopla who avan

considerad and wsra in favor of cooporaiing and
Joining the Party, not bacauss they v;ere in favor
of "Lha Party but for factual raasons and bacausa

thay thought that in this way the influenca of tha
Foreign Office would be maintained in a better way

than if they did not become members of the Party.
A few other people, however, were in favor of resign-'
ing office. I personally was very much in favor of
staying in office, and I pointed out that after I919
we had experienced quite different changes and devel
opments, and we even for some weeks had .;n almost

Bolshevik government of whrae people's deputies, and
shortly afterwards diu'ing' the Krpp Putsch we had a
different kind of goverrnnent, diametrically opposite.
How, if these two regimes h^,d oeen overcome in such
a short time, it was mainly due to the fact that the

officials stayed at their posts^ and comparing those
two revolutionary movements, the taking over of power
by Hitler was carried out in a constitutional and

leg^l manner.

Eventually it was of decisive ixifluenca

to us that the Minister and State Secratary advised us

to stay at our posts,

i think most 01 them stayed,

with very few exceptions.

I, at the time, called

the officials in my department together, ana on the
basis of the previous discussions, I advised them
to stay and I told them what my personal attitude

was."

(Transcript pages II749-II751).

This self-admitted choice of the defendant to cooperate
with Hitler was honored by him in his attitude and actions.

It becomes obvious from the documents, specifically linking

him with several counts of the indictment, but also from
iM

the confidence shown to him by other high dignitaries of
the regime, by the Foreign Office as well as by tha Army
High Command.

Hever, during the Nazi regime, did HITTEPHs

official importance or standing diminish.

His career during

the Nazi period was a rather brilliant one of continuous
ascendance.

He attempts to confuse this clear picture by

several lines of approach.in his defense, but the facts are
proved

/to the contrary.
R.ogarding the time immediately followiieg Hitler's access
to power, he himself statess
"1 remained the Chief of tha Commercial-

Political Department, and within that work I
maintained not only the same independence as

I had before, but I might even say that ray in
dependence increased from one point of view-"

(Direct, page II751).

I
-

6 -

H3 admits th£.,t uuring tha first few weaks aftar that fataful
day of 30 January 1933,

was prasant at various Gabinat

Meetings under Hitler (Direct paga 11752).

change took place very soon.

He claims that a

Hovever, nothing in tha evidanca

corroborates the highly incrediole negative part of his res
pective testimony readings

^ _ "At such meetings Harr von Neurath, the Foreign
Minister , would ^try to im^.intain close cooperation
with higher officials of the Foreign Office, but

alter tnose first iew weaks I was never again asked
lor my advice. I was not allowed to participate in
any decisions taken in foreign policy matters, and
I was not even informed of tha decisions taken." (Ibid).

RITT'JR^s appointment to the high position of Gormen Am-

^

bassador to Brazil, in 1937? was an outstanding promotion,
both in income and prestige, in spite of th:^ attempt of his

ri^nd, the defense witness Wilhelm Mackeben, to obscure this
j)

clear fact by alleging;
as iimbass£;dor, it

rcalitv

Shelf5^

^

honor, outwardly but in
(Transcript page II694).

The defandant himself attempts to create the impression
the uesire of the NSDAP to remove him from the Foreign
Cilice in

*
) ,was the
actual, tiiough unexpressed reason

for his apparent promotion (Direct page II753). But there
IS not ohe least fact to support this allegation which,

sover, is inconsistent with later developments, especially
subsequent assignment as the top liaison man between

Foieign Office and Army High Command. He himself states;

J

fact thatfnf

. "Except ior tha

did not pav anv^otr

officials of the Party

any definif

^ never noticed

page 1175^!
against my parson". (Direct,
It has already been mentioned that in I939, during his
stay in Brazil, RriT^ joined the xTazi party. The following
events, especially tha assignments given to him upon his re
call from Brai;il, show what amount of confidence the old

Party member, Riboentrop, had in the new Party member, RITT^,
-

7 -

The deienclant claims uhat after accomplishing his first spe
cial assignment, upon his recall from Berlin, he offered

his resignation to Ribbentrop who, however, refused to accept

it (Direct, page II762).

He also claims that Hibbentrop

again refused to accept that oifer when it was repeated after

the German attack upon Poland (Direct, pages II769, II770),
•^en more significant of Hibbentrop's and, of course,
also Keitel's, confidence in Hitter was his key-assignment

in 194-0 as top liaison man between Foreign Office ana High

Command.

The defendant himself states that in accepting

this position, he regarded it as a springboard for getting
influence upon decisions of foreign policy (Direct, page
11771).

He characterizes the high level of this position

by his recital that he had not to accept assignments from

anybody else but Hibbentrop personally (Direct, page II772).
This is elaborated in the following part of his testimony
cn directs

"A.

I

had no relation at all with the other

departments of the Foreign Office.

They

had

no directives or instructions to give to me, and it
never happened that any department tried to issue

any instructions to me, and if they did so, they

clothed them in the form of a request, and if I
wanted to assist one or the other, I could do so.
If I thought I could bring something about more
quickly with the CM than he did, then I did itOtherwise I had no relation with the departments
Q.

Were you subordinated to the State Secretary?

A.

Ho, not even to him, at least not unless he

deputized for the minister because the minister was

ill or absent."

Another symptom of the high aegree of inaependence of

1Ti*" '
r

ji

(Transcript, page 11775).

•

i

RITTTH's position was the fact, pointed out empiiatically
by him, that he did not belong to Riboentrop's working
staff (Direct, page II78O), but was on a higher level within

Hibbentrop's retinue.

The great prestige of RlTT^'s posi

tion, which singled him out even within Hibbentrop's so-callad

field headquarters, clearly appears from the detailed descrip
tion, by the defense witness Mackeben, of the respective
- 8 -

locations of Ribbantrop's and RITT^rl*s officos and rasidances

(Transcript pages 11695? II6965 11739? 1174-0).
In his testimony on his official contacts with Ribbantrop,

tha defendant grossly dishonored the truth, so appears, for
instance, from the following quotationss
"Q. Did Ribbantrop inform you — when you
reported to him, that is — about tha political
intentions and the plans he had far the future?
A.

«

^

He never did.

If ha did inform me

about something — for instance, during the pre
paratory stage of the military operation against
tha Balkans — than he informed ma only to the
extent that it was absolutely necessary for this
period of time. If I did find out anything about

intended political operations, then I usually
found it out through Jodl, the chief of the oparational staff, and not through Ribbantrop."

(Direct, pages II782, II783).

There is enough avidanca to rafute this allegatioa, especially

•!

among documents in Prosecution's Books, 7--A, 7-B, 8-A, 8-B

^

and 200, which will be discussed in later sections of this
brief.

Tha defendant's position gave him continuous opportuni

ties of personal conferancos with Ribbantrop (Direct, page

11782), Is it balievabla that, living in the Fiald'Head
quarters of Ribbantrop, ha should nevertheless and in spite

of the natura of his position not always and contemporan
eously have received inside information about the main out

line of Ribbantrop's foreign policy?
I

.

cn several occasions, during his ov/n testimony, the

defandant intimated that the assignments he recaived from
Ribbantrop, axtanded to such delicate mattars as the straight

ening out of Jurisdictional issuas betwaon Ribbentrop and

Keitel (Saa, for instance, Diract, paga 11784).
RITTRR was supposad to bo a policy coordinator gaaring
the Foreign Office and tha Army Hfgh Command to uniform and
Joint action-#

This appaars from the following part of his

tastimony on directs

9

"Q. V/asn't Ribbantrop vary much concarnad
that you should only nagotiata with Kaitel and Jodl
in tha OKW or did ha vjant to have you nagotiata with
other agencies too?

In the beginning of my activity I was par-

mitted to nagotiata only with Kaitel.

Ha was alraady

shockad whan I .told him X negotiated with Jodl.

In

the coursa of time I, of course, axplainad to him
that I could carry out his requests much easiar and
much more quickly if I could talk to IFodl bacausa I
couldn^t talk to Kaital so well. And than he agraad
to have ma talk to Jodl. But ha navarthalass in
sisted that X should talk to Kaital about certain

things and if X told him that Jodl and Kaitel ware

both absent and that I had to speak to '//arlimont,

than ho was alraady a little put out — ha said,

'I'iy liaison man should talk to Keltal or Jodl. ' "
(Transcript pages II784, II785).

RITTTR's position involved a wide range of initiativa

on his part for tha period until the war with tha United

I-

States, thus including tha aggressive war preparations
against Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as Russia.

This is

in substance admitted in the following part of his testimony

I

on direct:

"Q. And how about the possibility of taking
your own initiative, Mr. RITT"^? If any particular
matter was brought to your attention aid you then,
on your own initiative, start to work and discuss
with the OIC.V on your own or would it be better and
more proper to describe your position as being
one of readiness - you had to wa:;t in each case

whether you were going to be given any definite
task by Ribbentrop.

A'

It is necessary to differentiate between

two periods of time.

The normal state was that X

was in a state of prepL,redness and had to wait for
Ribbentrop to assign ma a cert-.in task. That was

the way, after America entered the war, when X with

draw quite clearly and deliberately from Ribbentrop.
Before that time, in the preceding ye^r, when I
still had the illusion or the hope that I might

.

V,

again gain for myself a useful position, I went to
see him on my own initiative, as I stated before, and
if any letter or telegram was received for which he
had not any reason to have me called, then I announced
myself to him and paid him a visit on my own."
(Transcript p-. 117^7) ^

He could not deny, though he attempted to color the
fact, thatiiis position involved the right to deputize Rib

bentrop in the issuing and signing of directives or instruC'
tions to Foreign Office reprosentatives abroad (Direct,
pages 11787-11789).
-

10 -

On several occasions, the defendant attempted to drama
tize the alleged antagonism of the FSDAP, and the Gestapo,

against him.

But nothing of relevance remains from this

point even if RITT.ER^s following story, in spite of its
strong small of fictional ingredients, is believed as true.

We again quote from his testiniony on directs
"Q.

For what length of time did you retain this

position as a liaison man?

The task was formally never finished. In
the Fall of 19^-4, however — as far as I remember it
was in August, but it may have been September — Gaus
^

was the first to tall ma this.

He said that the

Minister had requested him, G^us, to tall ma personally
that the Party had now finally demanded that I be dis
missed from the Foreign Office. Gaus then added this
as his personal opinion. Ha said the fact that the
Minister had delegated Gaus to inform me of that was

because he said the Minister knew that he, Gaus, con
sidered ma his best friend and hj knew that I

counted

Gaus as one of my best friends, and therefore the

Minister believed that if Gaus told me about it, it

j

might hurt me less.

Gaus then added that the Minister

wanted me to know that I should not worry about it,

that he, the Minister, would always protect me. In
answer to this last remark, I said to Gauss
'This
.last remark of the Minister's is more of an occasion

for me to have worries rather than removing them from

me', because this statement of the Minister's could

(

only mean that the Minister himself was worried that

the Gestapo, or some other agency, had some intentions
with me. Actually, on the next day, I got one suit
ready, as well as all the necessary baggage, in prepara
tion for the concentration camp. Two days later the
of the Personnel Department, Ministerial Director
Schroader, told ma that the Minister had commissioned

hm to inform me officially that the Party had now

finally demanded that I be dismissed from the service

of the Foreign Office. I than said that Mr. (^us had

I

already told me that personally two days earlier, and
I added that I expected" that, in the very next few days,
I vyould get a letter of dismissal. Than Mr. Schroader
said, 'Well, that is not so pressihg.' I than said I
would rather know for certain what the final disposi-

'>

tion was, and I wanted to get clarity on it.
was not sent any letter of dismissal.

I actually

I expectad it

every day. i drew the practical consequences from these
two pieces of information that Gsus and Schroeder gave
fliQ, namely, I no longer went into the Foreign Office
unless I was summoned or told that I had dome document

waiting for me, or unless there was some other occasion

for me to go there.

Approximately four weeks later,

when Minister Feubacher came to Berlin — a man with .

whom I was on very confidential terms and of whom I

j^ew that he was a close acquaintance of Kaltenbrunner's

.from the Vienna "times -- i sent this man to Kalten^
brunner and asked hi,m^to ask Kaltenbrunner quite
— ll

outright whathor tha Gestapo had any intantions with
me.

Neubachar came back and sta-^ad that Kaltanbrunnar

had answarad him in reply to his questions

"^Wa know

this guy HITT^. He is another Red. However, he
doesn't have to worry, we don't intend to do anything
with him.'

mean?

Thaii I

asked Neubachars

He is another Red?'

'What does that

Neubachar said he ob

viously meant the former good relations that existed,
which I had maintained with the left-wing partias.

In other words, my activity as a liaison man was not
formally concluded. I terminated it myself after
was informed by these two people, and this whole thing
had no practical significance anyhow, because I fell
ill at the beginning of December, and for that reason,
was unable to parform any work for sevaral months."
(Transcript pages II789, 11790)-

The following parts of the defendant's cross-examina
tion are raspactively illustrative of RITT.^'s ascendance
in rank undar the Nazi regime and of his exceptional posiP'

tion within the Foreign OfficeFrom T-panscript page 124422

"Q,

'

^

When did you go to Rio as an ambassador?

A.

In 1937-

Q.

Before that time, you were Ministerial Diractor?

Ji,

Yas, that is correct.

Q,

Is it correct that an Ambassador holds the rank
of a State Secretary?

A.

Yes."

From_Tiianscrjj)t 2age_12448j
"Q,

.... ♦ Is it correct that ..... your offices

were quite closa to thosa of the State Secretary?

^

A.

Yes.

..... I had my office next to the Minister

Q.

..... Is it corract to say about your activity,
and I quote, 'Mr. Ritter finally was given the

and State Secretary.

task' — this is after 1939 — 'Mr. Ritter was

finally given tha task of handling all questions
of significance between Ribbentrop and Kaitel'?
Is that essantially correct?

A. With a certain limitation, only whan Ribbentrop
gave me a mission."

RITTHB's role in the Nazi regime, different from the

foregoing, was descrioed to the Tribunal by the defense
witness Mackoben, a former subordinate of RIlTi'SR, one of
-
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psrsoxii^X friancis^ &s st.s"t3d. by Mcjckabsn hiuisslf

(Transcript paga II69I).

It is not nscassary for this

briaf to fully discuss this tastimony, but a faw spot chacks
Vvill ba nude with regard to its highlights.
The witness joins in the now popular tuna of "innar
resistance" in favor of the dafandamt hlTT^Hs

"V/hen I returned froni Guatemala it was g^^nForeign office tlxat H^r

RITTGR was not a Party man, but that at haart he

objacted to tna Party principles." (Transcript

page 11693).

H

'

Tha causa of humanity "wouIq have bean better served if

uITT^R and otners in his position had not "at heart" but by
^

"objected to the Party principlos."

Tna obvious bias and poor memory of this witnass, to
say the least, appear from those of his statements which

f

are strongly inconsistent with facts shown by irrebuttable '

documents, quoted in further portions of this brief. For
instance, he thus colors the nature of hITTGR's liaison
functions

^

nuAr

position with no chance of develop-

wer-'broncvt

decisions.

d^cidSd ht L
was to smcrth
Ribbentrop -nd^K-itnt'
to him by K-it^l

discnqqirnQ^ o

'

Matters

already been
remained
differences between

^^atters were brought

s-^for some orief preliminary

a^^ncy
agency in
m the
th-> Foreign
p
Office."
pass them (Transcript
on to the competent
p^ge II695)•

^
y

B

between Ribbentrop and RITTGR is, in fla-

*'consistency with an abundance of docunmntary material,

described by teckeben in th^ fniT

one I olio wing viiays

batwosn^RlT'j?*f'nri
prosshn t, h

wharwos
bin
On the contrary

"o faollng
of had
coiifidanco
KibD3atrop.
i nsvsr
ths im-

t

waiting for th^'t^n

Nor was RITTi^R^ont r-f

Minister roaily

sst33m3a
ona ancthar, or
supplement eacn other,
^

almost

^ iri^htful quarrel.

^ abld)h''''^

Lt'-'riiiiTlrTiniflTihlMiliiiii

Ona wcndars wliethar this tastlmony cnn ba givan any
credit, kno-wing that according x.o the witnass tha man v.-hom

tha R-:.ich Foreign Minister did not trust, remained his top
agent with tha Army High Coamiand i'or about four years, after
having received in the preceding two years equally outstand
ing assignments from the same Foreign Minister.
Anothisr fairy tale is offered by the witness in the
following part uf his testimony?
"Q.

Herr Mackeben, is it not scme-what remarkable

that accordiiig x.o what you have ^ust told the Tribunal
Herr RITTFR remained in his liaison post between
Riboentrop and Keitel Vi/ithout being initiated at all
into the real plans and intentions? Can you explain
that?

A.

Yes, for the outsider that really is re

markable and hard to believe, that a ma.n who had such

an extraordinarily important position, to have had

such a position as head of the Hccnomic Department of
the Foreign Office should afterwards h-ve such an unim
portant role.

But in actual fact it was like that.

Herr RITTHR really could only see very small segments
at a time, and everything that he knew or wanted tc

know over and beyond these ha had with great difficulty

to get from th^ various agencies.

Th-at resulted in a

Certain amount of resignation in his cas"^ and an .^v-r—

growing limitation to the small official positiLn"'hG
had as liaison man between Riboentrop and Keitel.

That

he was satisfied at all v^ith tnis post for any length

of time can only be explained by the fact that — and

I think l_can say this in his presence here
not a politician.

he is

He was an economist and remained

an economist all through his work.

Q.

Did you -ever see Herr RITTTR having political

conversaxions with furaign diplomats?
A.

I don't refiieiiiber any such conversations.

Really I think it would have oeen impossible to assign
such a task to him, because all the prerequisites, that
is, knowledge of political conditions in these coun

tries, were lacking. That applies only to the time,
of course, aftar he had givan up his post as rylinisterial
Director in the Economic Division because then, of
course, he did have conversations vvith foreign diplo
mats about ecouornic rel ;tions betvi/een Germany and the
countries abroad.

Q,

V/ell, I meant in particular at the time when

he vi/as liaison man,.

A.

In that position he did not hr ve such cun-

versations."

(Transcript pages II703, 11704).

-
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Tha quGS-Gion arisas how tho witness would have recon

ciled his testimony with such documents as, for instance,

Pros. Exhibit 369I (NG-5287), Doc. B. 200, ^.p.6l, which
shows RITTITR in political conversation with the Bulge,rian
Minister.

A pertinent continuation of the same approach, are a
few quotations from Mack^ben's cruss-examination.
FrpmJTi^anscript ,_pago 117^2;

"Q..

iifter you resigned did you still receive a pension?
Yas, I resigned as a "z.D" official; therofcre, 1
was aligible.

Q-

You did net really resign; you were only made
generally available.

Is that right?

^.

Yes.

Q.

And then you entered the services of an industrial
enterprise?

A.

Q.

Yes.

Were you paid a higher salary th.3re than you
were paid in the Foreign Office?

A.

Yes, one can say that."

Frpm_Ti:anscript page_lJ.733j

"Q. You talked about the relations of Keitel to
RibDontrop, Mr. Mackoban. Did you evar attand

with°rilTT^r"
A.

No.

Q-

Never?

A.

No •

Ribbantrop was togathar

Did you ovsr participate in a conference which
Keitel had with RITT,^?
A.

No, not that either.

Q-

Did you ever participate in any conference which
Jodl had with RITTFR?

A.

No, I didn't do that either."

Frpm_Tiianscript,_pago 11234:
Q* Is it correct that RITTFR had a airect telephone
line to Keitel and Jodl?

up with the Foreign Otfice

v.. Work which had the direct extension.."
- 15 -

1
The foregoing quotations from and comi-iients upon Mackeben's

testimony show its utter incredibility. - Such a testiii.^ny
cannot refute the picture of RITT^'s place in the Fazi

regime 5 presented hereinabcve on the basis of documentary
evidence.

t
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III.

RITT^_;.®_Ro1g in_th3_Saizura_of Czachosloyakia^
1.

Background_

By a stipulation, batwean Prosacution and Dsfanse, tha
indictmant against RITTIR under Counts I and II was limited
to his participation in the crimes ccnnactod with tha in

vasion of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939, tha wars against
Yugoslavia and Greece and the war against Russia (Trial

Transcript, pages 11741, 11742 and II760, II761).
Concerning the first mentioned matter, that is the
Seizure of Czechoslovakia, the IMT Judgment made these
findingss

"On the 14th March 1939? bhe Czech President

Hacha and his Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky came to
Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and dttended

a meeting at which the defendants von Ribbentrop,
Gearing, and Keitel were present, with others. The
proposal was made to Hacha that if he would sign an

ogreement consenting to the inccrpcrati^jn of the .

Czech^people in the German Raich at once Bohemia and
Moravia would be saved from destruction.

He was

informed that Garman troops had already received

craers to march and that any resistance would oe

Drokon with physical force. The defendant Goering
aaaod the threat that he wuuld destroy Prague
completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful

alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister put their

signature to the necessary agreement at 4s30 in the
morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf '
01 Germany. On th^ 15th March, German troops occupiod
Bonemia and Moravia, and on the l6th March the G^^rman
aecree was issued incorporating Bohemia and Moravia

into the Reich as a protectorate, and this decree
defendants von, Ribbentrop and

PP^197 198)^^^

Major V'ar Criminals, Vol. I,

Similar finding's of the IMT are among those specifically

directed against von Ribbentrop., Keitel and Jodl, (op. cit.
pag^s 285, 286, 288, 322, 323) "the three top men with whom
RITTTR had to work in his abovementioned liaison activity.
The great extent of RITTT5R*s cooperation with these
three men, one being his chief in the Foreign Office and
Hitler s top diplomatic agent for aggressive wars, the other
- 17 -
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two being the military leaders of .aggressive wars, appears
from the evidence in the present case.
Ordinance No-. 7 (Military Government-Garmanyr, Organi
zation and Powers of .certain Military Tribunals), contains
in its Article X the following provisions
"The determinations of the International

Military Tribunal in the.Judgment in Case No. 1
that invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars,
crimes, atrocities or inhumane acts were planned
or occurred, shall be binding on the Tribunals •
established hereunder and shall not be questioned

except insofar as the participation therein or
knowledge thereof by any particular person may be
concarned.

Statements of the International

Military Tribunal in the Judgment in Case No. 1
constitute proof of the facts stated, in the
absence of substantial new evidence to the con

trary."
In view of this stare decisis effect of the IMT find

ings and the fact that "substantial new evidence to the

contrary" was not adduced in the present case, either with
pegard to the Seizure of Czechoslovakia or with regard to
the aggressive wars in the Balkans and against Russia, our

discussion will be limited to an analysis of the evidence
shewing RITTSR's particixijation in those aggressive war
$

crimes established by the IMT.

..;K

2.

RITT5R^s^S£3cial_Mission_£iuring tho SgIzl^s of.
C z echo Slovakia

In 1939, RITT"^ worked in the Foreign Office in B-,riin
as Ambassador for Special Missions.

Without considering

his first assignment in connection with Czechoslovakia which
is 'outside of the limited scope of Prosecution's pertinent

charge against RITTFR, we may immediately turn to Prcsecu-

' < •

tion Exhibit 124, KG-3240, Document Bock 3B, Fngl. p. 332,

• .-v.,

a telegram dispatched on Ij March 1939 from Berlin to Prague,

.•1

reading;

«' -WA

"Urgent;
•

%

A

V.f

For Ambassador RITTFR.

Please inmmdicitely seize cypher office
and all material belonging to ft in the

Czech Foreign Office, and seal it up.

. '•.

Directions for further action follow

'

'

later.
r I j,'

signed;

^'VUIZSAFCKFR"

RITTFR admits that this telegram was delivered to him

in Prague on the'l6th of March 1939? but he also claims
that the directive ccntainbd therein was cancelled before

he could carry it out (Transcript page II764).

Hovjever this

may^be, it is significant that he arrived in Prague simultanocusly with the military invasion forces and stayed there

for Some period of time in performing a mission, the nature
of which is revealed by documents to be mentioned presently.

They were produced during the pertinent part cf his cross-

examinatioii (Transcript pages 12473-^2461) and appear in
Prosecution's Buok 200.

The defendant was evasive in his testimony on cross,

but he admitted that pursuant to his special assignment he
should have loft for Prague already on the IJth of March 1939?"
that he possibly left on that day, that ho arrived in Prague

iiif'jli'ii iLiirfrifii'l-Jf I

w-'

3ithGr in the evening of the Xjth or in the morning- of the
l6th of March 1939 and that hcj stayed in Prague for about
three to four weeks (TranscripV.page 12474).

The nature of

his mission he thus describes on crusss

"The only mission that I was given by the

State S.^cretary was to care f or the diplomatic
corps5 and during my stay there I was given two
or three other missions.

The first one was tO'

seize the ciphering material of the foreign
mission. I did not carry this out because this

was already done v;hen I arrived. I was then given
a few other assignments, by telephone or telegraph .
that I no longer remember." (Transcript page 12475)Upon the questioni

"You took.certain reprisal action against
the Czech diplomatic chiefs serving abroad, did
you not?",
he answereds

"It. is a definite fact th:;t I did not under

take any reprisal measures.

It is possible that

I was ordered to undertake seme fromBorlin."
.(Transcript page 12477).

There followed these further questicxes and answers,

highly symptomatic of the defendant's reluctance to admit
facts as long as he was not compelled to do it in view of
documents presented to hinu
"PHTSIL>ING OVDGI MAGUIhTi _ Well, du you
remember whether you did or didn't?
THH hlTl'JUSS! ,I remember that members on

the staff of Czech missions abroad who failed to

comply with the orders of their legal government
ware to be punished and what was being discussed

at the time was their discharge from emplcyment.

PRUSIDIhG JUD6C 'MAGUIRU-;

That wasn't the

question. Did you do anything a bout it? That's
what wo vjant to-find out.

TH^ VOThCSSs

I received directives

Berlin to confer with the Czech government on the
subject cond that's what I did.

Q.

(By Mr. earning) The pay of these offi

cials abroad was blocked, was it not?

A. At- this time I am unable to say any longer
whether there was actually any blockii^-, but tnere
w-as discussion of it and I was ordered by Berlin to
tell the Czech government tiiat those officials wno

failed to comply with the orders of the Czech govern

ment were to have their salaries suspended or they
were to be discharged from their offices.
-

•'Si i^f ii —''rii ilf'-'H-fiiVi

20,' ^

:'y

Q.: Do you furthor r^colloct th=at you orderod
tha "blocking of tha bank accounts of cartsin of tha
leading chiefs of missions-, .abroad?
DR.- SCHl'IIDT-LDICHH'iI^-; May it ploasa your
Honors, it is not clear te ma in what respect
this question is relevant in connection with
Counts I or II of the indictm-ent.
PR^SIDIHG JUDGD.i^lAGUIR'?:
overruled.
Proceed.

Q.

(By Mr. Gaming)

I beg to object.

The objection is

Will you kindly answer

that question.
A.

It*s a

definite fact tiia.t i t wasn't !

who gave tha order for this. It is possible, how
ever, that the guvernrnant in B^rlin ordered ma to
submit such a claim to tha Czech government."

(Transcript pages 12477, 12478).
•Thereupon Prosecution offered the follovjing: documents
for

iaentification and confronted the defendant with thorn:

Exhibit ^68Q (H'G-^'540) . Doc. B. 200, English
pages 22, 23, a telegram- from Waizsaecker, B5rlin,

.

K

to RITT'^R, Prague, of 26 March 1939 reading as follows
"'With th.e diplomatic and consular former

Czechoslcvakian Missions abroad, especially in
sofar as 'they are under -British, French, American,
and Soviet-Russian influence, there is an in
creasing tendency to .r:a.sist against the instruc
tion issued by the former Prague Foreign Ministry

I

•

-• n.W

to hand over affairs without friction to- the res

pective German missions.

The respective reports

have been and v\/ill be sent to you regulo.rly.

....

we are not willing to tulerate this action any
longer and are intending to take counter-measures

against the intractable mission chiefs, the per
sonnel misled by them and their interests in their

home-country.

Above all, it is our intention to

make the Prague-Government itself responsible for

it. I ask you to call on the former Foreign Min
ister Chvalkowsky in the course of Monday (27 Ivlr.rch)

and to^enumerate those measures which have now to be
taken iauaediately generally by tiie Prague Government

for the purpose of establishing order.

The measures

to iee mentioned should bj fixed in detail by phone

with the Foreign Qfiice on Monday morning. They will
comprise;
of protection, deprivation of citizensnip, freezing of payments of any kind, confiscation
of property and income for the participants them
selves and their dependents, etc. It will also be
conmiendable to take immediate measures in one or

another particularly bad case, This could be pub
lished and have a salutary deterrent effect. I ask
you to contact the Foreign Office by phone con
cerning this matter, on the 27th in the course of

->•7
M u

the morning."
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Exhibit ^660 Chg-5'^40) , D^c~; B. 200, ^ngl.
paga 24, a noba, datad Barlin. 27 Iviarch 1939) concarning
a phona call from RlrXlR, Pragua',
"Ambassadoi: HITTXK just cailad m^ from

Pr.agua, ihx''^rmix% ma gf'tha following;
^

-

. . . . . . .

*

1) 'Payma^ts for tha fntractaola. formar
CzachuSiuvakian Missicn "Chiefs have be^n frc'zan
since the 23rd of this month.
2)

Ambassador RITTCH has blocked on his

own responsibility the bank-accounts of 5 MissionChiefs, which he could find out.
3) Although there is no legal way to with
draw citizenship, a decree of the Ministerial
Council will today order the deprivation of
citizenship as 'well as the general confiscation
of property of the aforementioned Mission Chiefs."

Exhibit 3379 (NG-5030), Doc. B, 200, Mngl, page
20, a telegram from RITTCR, Prague, of 27 I^'Iarch 1939? has
the following texts

*1.) Pay of intractable officials abroad
was blocked on Thursday ,last week.
2.) On Saturday last week I

ordered to

block the bank accounts here of the Ministers

or Charges d'Affaires respectively in Paris,
Londv^n, '.ashingtcn, Warsaw, Moscow, and Santiago.
Today I shall inspect tax declarations and then
have additional assets confiscated.

3.) In today's Ministerial Council legis
lative measures necessary for loss of citizenship
and confiscation of property will be decreed.

4.) I propose to delay publication until
measures ad 3) have been taken. I v;ould than
prefer to have them published by the Government
hare."

It appears from these quotations, especially the

quoted report of RITTCR, that "on his own responsibility"
he had blocked the bank accounts of five mission chiefs.

It also appears irom the same source that there was "no

legal way to vi/ithdraw citizenship" of those mission chiefs,
but that he. nevertheless made arrangements for this with

drawal.

A ccniparison of tnese proven facts, with the
-
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avasiva langud^a or tha dafandant baf^ra ha was shovm docu- .

mant lJG-55^0 (Transcript pagas 12476-12480)5 illustrates
tha strong line of untruti'ifulnass in his def anse.

From tha facts and documants just shown, only one
conclusion can ba rsasonablydrawn;

tha defandant RITTTR

accaptad a Foraign Offica mission in Czachoslovakia simul-

tanacusly with or immediataly upon the military invasion
of that country.

This mission was carried out with a sub

stantial amount of initiative and discration on his sida

and in this way, he acted as a deputy of Ribbantrcp in the'
Foraign Office's part of tha saizure of Czechoslovakia.

Ha

consciously participc;t3d in depriving Czechoslovakia of har

®'^i^~coni.rul as an inaependent country, by compelling the
nominal Czochosluvakian Government to issue measures v^'hich

were illegal under the laws of that country, as ha stated
himself,

it is obvious that when RITT1IR thus cooperated

with Ribbontrcp, he was well aware of the flagrant violation
o,f international law involved in the methods whereby the
Czechoslcvakian Govarniiiant had been made to surrender its
independence.

- 23 -
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IV.

RITT2^_and_Gii^r^3n^s_Aggr3S3i

War iigainst Russia^

From a chronolcgical point of viavj, wo should naxt turn
to a discussion of RITllR^s rola in the aggrassiva wars in

tha Balkans.

Howavar, as a n^ttar of convanianca, wa shall

toko up that suDjact-mattor in a latar section and devota

tha prasant cna to a discussion of RITT'^'s rola in tha war

against the Soviet Union.

Tha aggrassiva character of this

vtfar was established by the lidT as follows i

"On tha 22nd June 1941, without any declara

tion of war,

invaded Soviet tarritory in

accordanca with tha plans so long made.
It was Gontanded for tha dafandants that tha attack

upon tha USSR was justified because the Soviet Union
was contamplating an attack upon Germany, and making
preparations to that end. It is impcssible to^balieve that this view was ever honestly entertained.

The plans for the economic exploitation of the USSR,
for the removal of masses of the population, for the
murder ^f commissars and political leaders, were all

part of the carefully prepared scheme launched on
the 22nd June (1941) without warning of any kind, and
without the shadow of legal excuse.

It was plain

aggression." (Trial of the Ma.jor v/ar CriminalsVol.
I,- pages 214, 2l5) •

In view of the stare decisis effect of the abovequotad

findings of the IB^IT concsrning tha aggressive and criminal
nature of Germany's war against Russia, this Tribunal may
limit its examination of the pertinent evidence to the ques

tion whether and, if so, in what manner, the defendant RITTUR
participated in that crime.

The pertinent documents con

tained in Doc. Books 8-A, 8-B and 200 will be discussed pre

sently. They show that the defendant was well aware of and
cooperated with the plans concerning the attack against

Russia, carried out on 22 Ju^a 19^^? 'bu.t prepared at a period
prior to 12 Ncveniber 1940 . ^

2/ Hitler's Directive Fo.lS of 12 November 1940,

3:iQ * *

444-PS, Doc.Bk.8-A,Ungl.pg.30 at 32?33)? contains this
paragraph;
"5)

Russia

preparabions tur tne /i-aso vynj-on

Tn tMs

bally ordered will be continued. Instr^
on this
Wiirfallow, as soon as the gcnerc;! outline ci tne
army's operational plans has bean submitt-d t^, ana
approved by, me."

In his high pcsitlon as top liaison man batwsen Foroign
Cfxica and Army High Coiiumana, tha dafandant must have had
c'ontamporaneous knowladga ci" tha so-callad Barbarossa Order,
that is the Sacrat Fuehrer Order Hu. 21, of l8 December 194-0,

i;xhibit 341, PS-4-46, Doc. Book 8-A5 "iJngl. page 35, Vv'hich con
tains this i n i t i a l sentencej

"The German Armed Forces must be prepared
to crush Soviet Russia in

quick campaign before

the end of the war against "England.

(Case Barbarossa) o"

Upon any discriminate approach, the possibility must
be ruled out that he should not have- had contemporaneous in
formation of that order.

He entertained close and continu

ing contacts with Keitel, Jodl and Warlimcnt, all of whom
had initialed that document which was -of the highest interest
to the Foreign Office as vi/ell as tu the Army High Corimiand.
Already prior to the Barbarossa Order, namely in

October 1940, if not earlier, the Foreign Office had engaged
in attempts to misrepresent to Russia the purpose of German

troop transports through Finland.

That RITT"^ was aware of

those attempts and actively participated therein, appears

from l^xhibit 33^ (NG-31S7)) Doc. B. 8-A, Hngl. page 24, a
secret telegram from RITTHR, Berlin, to Schulenburg, the
German Ambassador in Moscow, dispatched on 14 October 1940.
Its main body reads?
"Vfs should like to consider Mclotov's

inquiry which he put forward for the second time
and which concerns the transit of German troops

through Finland as superseded by other general

informa.tion which you took with you. 1 therefore
request that you do not revert to Molotov's in

quiry • on your own account.
renew his inquiry I request
deal with it by way of said
Molotov still should insist

If Molutov should
that you atteaipt to
information. If
upon it, I request a

new telegraphic report."

That the defendant's function as pwlicy-coordiriator

between Army High Coimnand -and Foreign Office included tha
field of military preparations for the planned war against
- 25 -

Russia is ravealad by "xhibit

IJiigl;- page

D'-'C. B. 8-B,

a top secret note, dated I3 March 19'^!, signed

by Hitter, readings
^fQe,a-3raX v/arliraont and Captain Buerkner

pointed out that tor certain reasons, it would
be necessary to terminate the activity of the
various Russian ComiTnissions on German soil and
to send them home quickly
The presence
of Russians in this part of "Germany can'be tol

erated only until March 25th. In the Northern
•sector, there is already a strong concentration
of German troops.

Starting from Idarch 20th, a

still greater number will, be concentrated there."
The contemporaneous meaning of this document cannot be
misunderstood but the defendant nevertheless attempts to

misrepresent it as innocuous (Direct page ll657)With regard to axicaher docuiaent of similar probative

effect, Txh.

NG-3'^88, Duc. Book 6-B, Tngl. page 155

RITTDR coruDines the method of flat denial of his authorship
vjith that of obviously untrue interpretation of the con

tents.

Raferonce is made to his Secret Talegram to the

German Embassy at Prassourg, dSLad 23 April 1941, readings
"1,

Because the railroads in the Government-Geiiaral
are used to full capacity by oha goods traffic,

it is necessary temporarily tO' divert through

Slovak territory certain troop movements into
the Government-General, which are necessary to

protect the frontier.

Therefcre

it is planned

to unload 3 divisions at suitable points, j'.long
the railroad line between R-^senberg and PresoV,

which will still be exactly determined.

The

troops will subsequ-ently march on foot into the

Government-G->neral. The unloading of the troops,
who otherwise carry the necessary provisions etc.,
would take place at the following datess Tne

first division between 1 and 8 May. The second
division between 9
May. The third divi

sion between 25 and 30 May.

2. I may ask yuu to notify the Slovak Government
of our intention and to procure_their agreement.
Oil this occasion it auy be mentioned that in
view of the close friendship between cur two
countries we definitely rely on the Slovak
Government fulfilling our request as nitherto
without making any objections. Fur the rest
I ask you to emphasize that these troop move
ments are a purely defensive measure."
-
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RITT'TR's coniciantj on diroct (pagos II&67, II868) rsads;
"I prasunia that this talagrarn v;cs sant off
ov^r rny signatura, although I know nothing about
it at tha tima. That's tha fii^st _iniprassion I

had whon I sav*/ tha docuniant haho in ths bookj bo-

causa I cannot fqcall'it.

I hsdnd'h-irq in court,

from my collaaguos in tha Foraign Office, something
that surprisad ma graatly -- that fraquontly tolagrams Vv'ara sant off ovar othar porsans' signatures
without their knowing of it. I had supposed that
that was imposs-ibla^ but onoa I heard it, the only
expla,n:?,tiou that I have is that this tolagrani was
sent without my having seen it. However, I should
not like to go su far as-to say that Ribb^ntrop
did this purposely, I presiacaa. that this v;as due to

negligence on the psrt of his office. _ j^ppareatly
he gave sorneuae the job of putting this natter be

fore me, to get my signatura^ and then this matter

was ovekooked in the office, and the telegram was
sent off. Moreover, this is a relatively unimpor

tant telegram, although, had I, seen it, I should

have signed it without any qualms whatsoever, ecause I knew at that time that there were large
concentrations of Russian troops on the German

-astern border; and I likewise know, both before
UJ.C3<JUOO J-Uil with Jodl and,J
-•
the discussion
all
the

A ^ r.-.-; T

it, thc.it as a saourity nia.asurs th3r2
siniilc^r
trLop concantrations on tha part oi tha G.^rmns.
Consequently, I should have seen nothing si^prising
^

^

T->.-it.Vnna

i m r I S li.

in the fact that three divisions were moving tuWc.rd
the Eastern boundary via Sl^-vakia,"

Again, no discriminate reader will be gullible enough
to remain uniri^ressed by the ubvio-us untruth of this story.

Pros. -xh. 354, HG-3544, Due. B. 8-B, Fngl. p. 26,
a document signed by RITTTR's subordiix^^te Kramarz but with
HITT^iR himself on tha distribution list, reveals the nature

of the Foreign Office's camouflage acilvities parelleling
the military preparations for the war against Russia.
The text of this memorandum of 7 May 194-1 reads;
"The following wording regarding tha rumors

of an alleg3d danger of war between Germany and

the Soviet-Union has been transmitted to tn^

G'.riman Military Attaches in Ankaro, Bern, ^^^l-

singfers, Llssabon, Pressburg, oteckholm, T- o

and Tokici

-
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in Gjriiiany-.

w:-.r rufiiors ;:ir3

curront also

Ivlalicious c;ttacks by England

suspactad.
Cause lor ruiiiors are considarabla Russian cunc3ntr;;aciuiis of troops

naar tha, frontier, which cj>nnct ba justi
fied from a military viawpoint, as oho
nurabar of Garmau troops at tha frontier
is limited to tha extant as is absolutely

necassary for tha rear protaction of Bal

kan oparatioiis, ' Countahihg current nmiors

by German offices ' aspac'ially desired'. ' In
this connaction i t should ba mantionad in

appropriate fornij that continuous German •
transports are carriad out from tha ^ast

to tha Wast, which even daring tha first
half of May reach a considarable daHraah"
•^an

RITTIR's d'efanse-counsal admitted that "from

today's point of view this probably can ba racognizad as

a camouflage" (Transcript page 11368), but RITT'® hirasalf
prafarrad a wholasala denial of such interpretation of the
document by claiming:
"I can't ramambar this document v^ith certainty.

This doGumant, which is not a telegram, certainly
originated in tha following way; Kramerz, tha
Director of tha Dapartment Pol. I/M, had tha tasks,
as I subsequently discovered, of carrying un the
correspondence between military attachas and the

three branches of tha Wahrmacht, and to supervise
and regulate this correspondanca.

In this capacity,

a telegram xrom the OKH — trx-.t is, tha High Cofririxand
of the Army — to the military attachas mentionad
in the document was cartainly brought to his attahtion. Ana Kramerz considered it importaxit enough
to inihrm the Foreign Office of this uniform policy
from tha OKH to the military attaches.
But as to
what I thought at that time about this I can't ra-

membar today. I do not prasunia that I should hava
raga.rdad it then as a sula camouflaga. Rathar, tha
intention in all thasa places — Barn, Ankara,

Lisbon, Btcckholm, ate. was to have rC uniform pol
icy so tiia.t one military attache would not ba say

ing one thing and another something alsa."

(Direct,

page 11869)

It will not be difficult, for tha Tribunal, to cut
through this cobweb of fiction.

Prosecution ^h. 357?

NG-3172, Doc.. B. 8-B, Tngl. p. 31, is a secret telagram
from RITTDR tc the G3rm:'.n Embassy in Bucharest, datad 23
May 1941, ini'urming tha Titbassy thc;t a naw German army of
six to seven divisions would ba formed in Roui.enit.,

Its
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purpcss should bo prasaatod to Antonascu a.s bain^ ''for the .
protocoion of Eou..ani&-".g-dnst •ovantual Russian attack."
Is it possible to accapt the following part of the explana
tion of this document by xhe defendant;

"With reference to the actual contents

of the telegram, these inf crar.tions coming
in such a period of strife and misunderstand
ing and conflict, could hardly serve to
clarify any doubts as to what was rxtually

happening." (Direct, page II87O)

Prosecution Uxh. 371? i'G-3'1'^2, is a memorandum by
RIlTalR of 23 July 1941 written after G3rmany had begun

her aggressive war against Russia.

Its main body reads

"The OM reports the following;

'o Danish request for an increase of the Danish
Army by abuut 2000 men has been submitted to the
OKV^ through uhe Military Attache in Copenhagen.
n

The COiiUiiCnder of the Replacement Army is of the
opinion that this request may oe granted but

should be made concomitant with the demand tnat

a unit of voluLiteers of the Danish Army, in the

strength of about one regiment, similar^to the
case of Croatia, should be put at the disposal
of the Ge^'^oan Army, for the fight against Bol

shevism.'

The CKW asked about our position.

I propose that the Danish request for -.n in
crease of the Danish Army by about 2000 ruen

should be granted, provided that besides the

Danish volunteer corps - a closed unit of the

Danish Army in the strength of about one regiment
participate in the fight against Russia." (Doc. B.

^"B, Bngl. p. 76).

To the docufiient ^.ttached is Phe following handwritten

statement, dated 30 July 194-1, and signed by Hewels
"1 presented this nooe to the Fuehrer
in the presence of Ge^ibral Judl. The Fuehrer
s

gave his consent to the proposal as outlined
in the above note. Ha considers thereby also

the possibility of facilitating the occupation
tasks of our Army by utilizing foreign units."

This document is illustrative of RITTCR's coordination

of the policies of Foreign Office and v/ehrmacht, and of his
voluntary participation in shaping the policy of waging

aggressive war against Russia.

The defendant tries to color
'
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his prcpcsal in thct momorL-;ndum so qs to lot it cppoar as

tho moroly rainistorial function of forwarding a suggostion
from anothor side to Riob^ntrop out not as tho discrotionary
functioii of rocommonding that suggosticn to Rihbontrop

(Diroct, pago 11875)-

Howov,'r, tho languago of his momoran-

dum proves the coiitrary.

RXTTRR's sanctimonious answer to a question of his dofonso counsol concorning his reaction to tho actual begin
ning of tho war against Russia, was;
"liy roacbion, noadlcss to say, was a vory

heavy disappointment with raferenco to the matter
itself.

This is of minor importance, but as it

was delivered first to me personally it was a

great disappointment for not only had Ribbentrop

f--,iled to inform mo, but he had doceived mo and_

ho had acted behind my back. I expressed ray opin
ion to Ribbentrop hirasolf in very clear terms and
the conclusion and consequences that I personally
drew from this great disappointment was, that I

caraa to recognize the fact that Ribbentrop didrkt
Gcnsidor mo as being a consultant and a responsible
co-worker at his side but much rather that ho was

only using or rather abusing lae in order to settle
the disputes that he had with Keitel which in most
inst;uices were not very important ones.

Frora

that tirae on, I gave up all hope — that is, the
hope in which I had undertaken uhis task of liaison

man — the hope that X would be able to gain politi
cal iniluence.

I

came to see tnat'tnat was an en

tire raisconception on ray part, and I withdraw from
Ribbontrop to the ^^reatest possiole extent."

(Transcript page ll877)o

In line with "chis his position on direct, ho flatly
ansv^ered "No" when he was asked on cross;

"Once Germany was at v/ar with Russia you

abandoned your pro-Russian attitude, dad ycu not?'
(Transcript page 12484)

He again answered "No", whan the follovdng further
question was put to him by the cross-examinerg
'tyou recall a conference held one week
aft"^r the invasion on the question of recruit

ing foreign volunteers in the regular army and

Waffen SS for the campaign in Russia, do ycu
not?"

(ibid)

30

But h-3 could horc.y concccl his ambarrcssmjnt when

i;xhibit 3602, NG-4^52? Doc. Book 200, ^ngl. page 27, was
introducsd by the Prosa-cution, and whan ha was axaniinad

regarding its contents.

(Transcript page 12485)•

His subfiiissi\fa .answaf was^
"I mysalf don't racollact this at all, but
I am sura tha document you introduced is right.
How, whether full agreement was achieved in re
gard to each specific item under discussion must
be disclosed "by tha documant itself, but I am un
able to confirm this to be the case

in answer to

your question as I have not read the documant

word for word." (Transcript page 12485).
Turning to the document itself, wo find that Exhibit

3682 (re-4652), consists of two parts.

One (Doc. Book 200

page 27) is the Minutes of a conference in the Foreign

Office in Berlin on 30 June 194x, under the chairmanship
of HITTHR, containing this passages
"In opening the conference, ^imbassador RITTHR
stated th:;t the Foreign Office considered it very
important that theolfices, represented at the con

ference, should agree on general directives for the
tre.-tment of foreign volunteers in order to enable
the Foreign Office to issue instructions to those
of its missions abroad which had been or would

probably be approached by volunteers.

After basic

agreement on the question of treatment of foreign

volunteers had been effected, it w/culd then be
left to the offices directly concerned, especially
the OKV/ and the SS Main Office, to handle the prac
tical aspects of this matter.

Political expedien

cies necessitated a positive attitude to this ques
tion .with regard to the present battle against
Soviet Russia as v^ell as the future political de
velopment in Hurcpe."

The other part of the Exhibit is a telegram from RXTTHR,

dated 11 July 1941, distributed as directive among the Gor

man Foreign office representatives abroad, containing the

following introductory passages
^"Principles have been established in con

junction with the appropriate offices, in partxcular with uhe OKvV and Waffea-SS, concerning

the employannt of foreign volunteers in tha

struggle against the Soviet .Union and its tech
nical application. The rmain points ares"

(Doc- B. 200, .^iegl, p. 37),
31 -

itu'-

"-oi.

At thJ end 01 this telegr-m RITT^ stated;
"In ccuntri:;s in v.-hich th3r3 era Gsrmnn missions

1 roquast the hao.ds of the missions to soa to it carofully that all political negotiations_concerning tha
quostion of volunteers, i.a. negotiations with govern
ments, political organizations and similar agencies
are conducted by the head of the mission, whereas the
technical-military quesbions are to be dealt with by
the v/ehrmacht attache." (Doc. 3. 200, "^ngl. p. 40).

In view,of the foreguing documentary, aiaterir.l, there
Ci-innot be -^ny doubt that RITTDR, in his capacity as coor

dinator of Lhe policies of Foreign Office and nrmy 'High
Command, fully participated in Germany's aggressive war

against Russia, and that he actively furthered this policy
both during the phase of the preparations for and the actual
waging of that war. ,

/.I

V. Ritt3r„c.nd„Garnio.nyJ^3^A£gro£S
1i

iu_tho_Bclki:.ns_^

Bapk^i^ound .

The nipst importaxxt among the charges unaer Gounts I

arid JI ag^irist the defendant hITTTHs is his criminal role
in the historical events Vvhich the Judgment of the Inter

national Military TriDunal suniiuarized in its findings en

titled "The Aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece."

(Trial of Major War Criminals, Vol. I, pages 212, 213).
In the final part of these findings it is saids

"On the 6th April (194-1), German forces in
vaded Greece and Yugoslavia without warning, and

Belgrade was bomhed by the Luftvi/aife-

So -svjift

was this particular invasion that there had not

been time to establish any 'incidents' as a usual

preliminary or to find and publish Quy adequate

'political' explanations. As the attack was start
ing on the 6th April, Hitler proclaimed to the
German people that the attack was necessary^because
the British forces in Greece (who were helping the
Greeks to defend themselves against the Italians)
represented a British attempt to extend the war
to the Balkans.

It is clear

that aggressiye

war against Greece and Yugoslavia had long oeen in

contemplation, certainly as early as August of 1939•

The fact that Great Britain had come to the assist

ance of the Greeks, and might thereafter be in a

position to inflict great damage upon German in

terests was nada the occasion lor the occupation
of both countries."

The defense of RITTIR did not adouca new evidence in

the attempt to have this Tribunal reach findings, contrary

to that of the II;5T, concerning the aggressive nature of
the Gfarman invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece, but merely

repeated v^/hat had already been considered and found lacking
in persuasive effect by the IlflT.

This Tribunal need there

fore not re-analyze the pertinent background facts, stated
in the above-cited portion of the IBTT Judgment. Further
parts will be quoted presently?

"On the 12th August 1939, Hitler had a con
versation with Ciano and the defendant von RiDben-

trop at Obersalzberg.

He said than?
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*Generally speaking, the best thing
to happen would be for the neutrals to be
liquidated one after the other. This pro
cess could be carried out more easily if

on every occasion one partner of the Axis
covered the other while it was dealing
with the uncertain neutral. Italy might

well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of
this kind.'

...

.

"On the 13th December he (Hitler) issued a
directive concerning the operation 'Marita', the
code name for the invasion of Greece,

..........

"On the 3rd March 19^1, British troops
landed in Greece to assist the Greeks to re
sist the Italians;

"On the 25th March, on the occasion of the
adherence, of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact
at a meening in Vienna, the defendant von Rib-

bantrop, on behalf of the German Governmant, con
firmed the determination of G^rijany to respect

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

Yugoslavia at all times. On the 26th March the
Yugoslav Ministers., who had adhered to the
Tripartite pact, were removed from office by a
coup d'etat in Balgrade on their return from

Vienna, and the new Government repudiated the
pact. Thereupon on 27 March, at a conference

in Berlin vdth the High Coaimand at which the
defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl were pre

sent, and the defendant von Ribbantrop part of
the time, Hitler stated that Yugoslavia was an
uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated
attack on^..Greece, and even more so with regard
to the attack upon Russia which v^as 10 be con

ducted later on.

Hitler announced that ha was

determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new Government, to make all

preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia
militarily and as a national unit. He stated

that he would act with 'unmerciful harshness.'

"On the 6th April, German forces invaded

Greece and Yugoslavia without warning, and B-.lgrade
was bombed by the Luftvi?affe."

211, 212)

(Op. cit. pages

Tha partinant findings of tho IIMT ragarding Ribbantrop,
Koital and Jodl are of tha sama etara docisis effact as tha
abovaquotad gauaral findings of tha IJ.rT concarning th., his
torlcal facts ana i.ha aggrassiva nature of l>'azi-C5armany s

wars against Grooca and Yugoslavia.
269, 323) ,.
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(Op- cit. paguS 2b6,
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Ganoral DGScription of RITT'^'s Rola In tha
Aggrossions against Gr3-3ca and Yugoslavia.

Tha docamants of tho prosecution in Books 7'A^ 7~B and

200 clearly prove the Foreign Oifice's, and especially
JlITT'^xi's participation in the aggressive wars against Greece
and Yugoslavia-

In particular, they prove that Lhe Foreign

Office defendants, and especially RITTIIRs

(a) Had inside information on their planning
for a considerable time before the beginning of
V

tho military operations,
(b) paved the way for the military operations
by certain diplomatic actions including the
(c) were securing the cooperation of certain
countries, such as Hungaria, Roumania, Bulgaria and,
until the coup d'etat in Belgrade, also of Yugoslavia^

(d) neutralized potential foes and isolated
prospective victims by a series of non-aggression

pacts (Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia), engineered
for the purpose of securing the Garman flanks and
rear 5

(a) exercised diplomatic camouflage,_ screening

the preparation ox"" and attempting to justify the
aggressive acts.

Those aocuments also prove the vital role of RITTIR who

(a) was continually inlormed, by the Army High
Coiiimand of top-secret war plans, custoiuarily not dis

closed to other government agencies^
(b) coordiruited military and Foreigx: Office
requirements and policies with a substantial amount

of initiative and discrationj

(c) had authority to speak in the name of Rib-

bentrop in liaison matters with the Army High Command5
(d) made pertinent suggsstions both to Ribbsn-

trop and to the military top men5

(a) plotted Foreign Office tactics under general
supervision of Riobeutrop^

(f) worked in these matters in close cooperation
with Weizsaecker.

Ubllibb

Tha corractnass of tha abova garxarol propositions will

ba illustratad, in tha following subsacLions, by rafarancas

I'J
<

'

to specific documants, tying in the dofandant RIinH with

particular faaturas of the ovarall picture just presented.

. 'i'ii
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3.

RITT3Rls_Awaronjss_of Garman^'^s Aggr3Ssivo_Vifar_
Graeca,^

Thara cannot "ba any doubt about tha fact that HITT'^'R
agfi-ressiva

had full insida information concarning Gormo-ny's/intanticns

against Gr3eca, at tho latast upon his appointmant as top
liaison man batwaan Ribbantrop and Kaital-

Tha assumption

that tha dafandajit could hava baan amployad by Ribbantrop,
as his liaison man with Kaital and Jodl without such insida

information, is a prapostarous and tharafora salf-dafanting
prop OSi t i Oil.

Turning to docuiiiants, illustrating tha foragoing ganarnl

statemant, wa may first montion Prosacution Exhibit 26t
(•£G^3232)?

a raport by von 7/r?izsnack3r on a convarsation with

tha Grhak anvoy of 8 May 1940, prior to Italy's invasion of
Graeca (28 Cctobar 1940).

This docuniant, which shows RITTTR

on tha distribution list, ravaals tha pr3ss propaganda, mada

by Italy in praparation of tho plannad aggrossion of Graaca,
and tha support of this propaganda oy tho G^rhie.n Foraign

Offica.

Tho documant clearly rovaals tho fabrication of tho

prataxt of an imminent Franco-British invasion of Graoce, or

of "a second Saloniki", an apprehension without any founda
tion at that time.

Certainly a man of RiTTTR's background

and position knew how to road and how to understand such

diploiiUitic language".

We next take up Prosacution Exhibit hb. ^0 (FGn33.i4)9

Doc. Book 7-a, "^ngi. p. 29, a mamorandum signed by RITTIR
himself, on 29 Cctobar 1940, that is on tha day following
Italy's invasion oi Graaee.

Its text rands^
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"Up to this dato tho Army High CommL-;nd did.
not taic3 ciny stops with rogard to ostablishing

direct contact vath the,Comi'nandor-in-Chiof of^tlu
Italian Army in Qrooco, since it wanted to wait
(to see) whether General Field I\/Iarshal Keitel has
made any arrangement to that effect in Florence.

If, after Goneral Field Marshal Keitel's return
it should become evident that this vjas not the

case, the hriiiy High Cominand will decide vjhetner^
contact should be established via a special liaison

officer or via the military attache in Home._ There

are so far very few reports concerning the military
situation in Greece.

The Italian advance is being

carried -out according to schedule, but is hanpored
by bad weather. In one place Greek troops allegedly
penetrated into Albanian territory.

There are not

yet any reports concerning activities of the
British on the continent or the Greek islands.

The British war ships have so far not l^ft Alex

andria. Fngland ordered the Greek merchant ships
to enter British ports immediately and has_ forbid
den them to enter foreign, including Frencn ports."

«

«

The document clearly reveals RITTTri's first-hand know
ledge and inside information of the Array High Comi-iand'splans
with regard to prosoeotive Gerx.nn military action in

JGreece, It also illustrates the sham nature ot the alleged

danger of a British invasion in Greece, prior to the Italian
attack upon that neutral country.

The following pertinent

statement of RITTKR on direct (Transcript page II809) may be
quoted as an illustration of his attempts of distortion of
^

documentary evidence oy grossly false comments thereon^
"This Is a file note such as I regularly

made when, for any reason at all, I was in Keitel's
or Jodl's presence and everyone of them told me

something that I considered worth mentioning_to
Ribbentrop.

I had this memorandum-sent to Ribben-

trop and also sent it to the Foreign Office in^^
Berlin, as can be seen from the short list of dis
tribution at the bottom.

In the last paragraph

it says that the reports concerning activities of

the British on the continent or in the Greek Islands

as of 29 October 1940 were considered as being im
portant and were given much attention. X have al

ready given you details on this metter. From the
last paragraph of this memorandum it can also be
seen that the close contact at th.;t time ^between
the Greek and British govermients existed.

Be

cause if Tnglccnd could tell Greek merchant ships
vi/hat harbors they could enter and what ports tnoy

could not enter that could only be done, of course,

with the agreement of the Greek government."
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HowQvar, tha part of tha documant, thus color ad by the
daf andant, doas not at all baar out what
Tribunal to raad into it.

wants tha

Tha first tvjo santancas "Thara

ara not yat any raports concarning activitias of tha British
on tha contin-ant or tha Graak islands.

Tha British v^iar ships

hava so far not laft Alaxandrin", wara written tha day aftar
tha Italian invasion of Graaca.

According to uha sama docu-

mant, "the Italian advanca (was) being carriad out according
to schedule".

This is certainly not indicative of any "close

contact at that time batwaan tha Graak and tha British Govern

ments".

Nor can anything of this kind be cor-cludad'from tha

next sentanca reporting about a ona-sidad maasure of tha
British, countering tha Italian aggression of Graaco.

>^2 turn to Pros. Txh. 282., NG-^155.i Doc. B. 7--A ?

'k'.i

Tngl. paga 5^? which consists of tv;o documants, one of them
being a top secret mamorandum, dated 23 Dacambar 1940,

signed and initialad by HITTDR, referring to an attachad time
schedula for tha first staga of operation Marita.

This tinie-

schedula is salf-axplanatory concarning HITT'^'s inside in

formation.on Germany's aggressive war plans against Graaca

at such an early data.

Favarthalass, in comraanting tharaon,

ho dared to niaka the following pleas
"If you sea this tima table from tha parspec-

tiva of December 1940 one should have to coma, on
tha contrary, to tha conclusioii th-t it was not

even decided to attack Greece."

(Transcript paga 11812),

The utter incredibility of this plea was brought out

M

in the Court's examination of the witness?

Ifj

• •/.

"PRDSIDIiTG JUDGD i'MGUhilli

May I interrupt

to ask one or two Quastions, witness,

ii/hat was

'sr

tha data of the Italian offensive in Alb-.nia and

toward Graaca?
THD WITFTSSs

you tha pracisa data.

Octobar 1940.

I can't tall

I baliava, however, it was

' aithar the l8th or 26th of October.
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a.vM,

i'^W''*5>'

Im.
PHIiSIDIHG JODG^ A'lAGtlltiGi
And what was tha
date of the British landings on Crate?

TH^ v/IThGSS=.
know the

January, hut again I don't

exact data.

PR?;SIDI;~G JTJDGl H'l^iGUIHli
TH^ WITN^SSs

January 1941?

January 1941.

PR^SIDIi'G JUDGC ivi^GUIR^;

(Transcript page II813).

Thank you."

Finally, attention is called to that part of pros. Txh

300, KG-3097, Doc. B. 7-B, ^gi- page 22 at 27, consisting
of a Top Secret Order of the Army Eigh Command, dated 3I
• January 1941, signed by Keitel, with a distribution list
including HITTER as the only ona in addition to strictly
military units.

For tha present purpose it is sufficiant

to quote tha following two initial santancess
"According to new Fuehrer decisions, tha
following instructions apply to furthar prepara
tions for Operation Klaritag

1)

Intended attack against Greece to take

place at tha beginning of Aprils"

(Doc. B. 7"®?

Engl. page 27).

In spite of the clear language of this document, tha

defendant boldly suggasts to read into•it

defense - rather

than offense - praparations by Garmany (Direct pages 11830,
11631, 11632).

-
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4.

RlTT]3l_and_tha_G§rmau Troo£ Conc3n;U7ations_in
Roumania.

Tha German troop concentracions in Roumania wara ona of

the most important and most elaborate military praparations

for Germany's attach upon Graece,

In order to camouflage

their real purpose by a diplomatic smoke-screen, a task
performed by the defendant RITT^, consisted in the allega
tion of an innocent training purpose of those Gorman units
sent to Roumania.

One of the illustrations of his activity in this matter
is his proposal in his teletype massage to 'Ribbentrop of

8 October 1940, prosecution :^h. 278-3, iTG-37615 Doc, B.
7-A, Sngl. pa^a 53

55 •

Upon approval of this proposal

by Ribbentrop, RITTIR in a long distance phone conversation

with Germany's diplomatic representative at Bucharest,
I

Minister Fabricius, gave instructions regarding a related

press-release to be suggested to Roumania.

(Pros. Hxh, 278,

NG-3781, Doc. B- 7-A, Rngl. page 43 and RITTUR on direct,
page 11809).

The following passage of those instructions

is obviously inconsistent with the alleged bona fide train
ing purpose of the German Military Mission in Roumanian
"It is of principal importance that the
action has an anti-English character.and under
no circumstances an anti-Russian character."

(Underlinings added).

Nevertheless, RITTER describes the nature of his acti

vities regarding those German troop concentrations in
Roumania as a merely economic one.

This was his first as

signment as Lop liaison man between Ribbentrop and Kaitel.
He states?

"After I took over this new assignment, the

first mission had to do with troop transports to
Roumania

These were economic functions which I

had to porform.-" (Transcript, page II79I)-
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Hg also ploads?
"I had no reason at the tima

and today

I am still of tha opinion that this first training
division (LGhrdivision) was.sant there as such, in
that capacity, and not at all for camouflagG pur

poses."

(Transcript page 11793)-

However, according to his pvm testimony, "Keitcl informad (hira) personally that a second training division
was to be sent to Rouniania, ana that he had discussed with

G-^neral Antonescu, the Roumanian Chief of State, the sending
of a fevi/ other divisions to Roumania

" (Ibid).

RITTTR's defense is refuted by a number of documents

which definitely prove his contemporaneous knowledge of
the real nature of those German "training units" in
Roumania.

They also prove the camouflage character of the

performed diplomatic maneuvers where he participated.

One

of those documents. Pros, ^h. 280^ (rG--314-^), Doc. B. 7-^,

Rngl. page 56? is his top secret report of 25 November 19^0,
concerning conversation with Keitel.

The document not only

shows that RXTTHR was kept informed about confidential

military matters, but also proves that he was aware of

Germany's particular purpose rather than Roumania's train
ing interest in the German troop concentrations.

His pro

posal to Keitel, ohat Ge^^iuny should pay for the mainten
ance of these troops in Roumania, does not offer any other
reasonable explanation.

In the same connection, reference may also be made to

.exhibit 280, HG^31'^5, Doc. Book 7-A, ^ngl. page 59, a top
secret telegram from the Army High Comniand, dated 21 Decem

ber 1940, initialed by Jodl and RITTCR.

It contains this

passages

"In view of the Balkans situation the
Fuehrer has now ordered the assembling of a

further strong force in Southern Roumania,

-
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which will oc indopcndont of the vvohrmacht Mission,
and which has boon put undar .tho command of Field
Marshal List.

In certain contiggoncias its mission

Vviml bo to advance tinrough friondly Bulgaria and
Vi/ithout trespassing on Yugoslav or Turkish terri
tory to uhe Aegean Coast - if the situation demands

it, also lurther on into Greece, in order to keep

the British out of this area.

A hint to the effect,

that such Gn^Hxan action is possible, was made to
G->neral Antonescu by the Chief of the OKV/ already
at the end of November, on the occasion of the for
mer's Berlin visit."

^

(Doc. B- 7-A, "IJngl. page 59) •

Pros. ^xh. 290 (DG-3189)s Doc, Book 7-A, Fngl. page 82,
a cable dated 9 January 1941, from RITTfE to Fabricius,

the G.-^rman diplomatic representative in Bucharest, illus
trates the importance of RITTTh's participation in this

matter of the troop concentrations in Roumania, prepara
tory to the German attack in the Balkans.

In his pertinent

commant (Transcript pages 11820-11822), the defendant

stresses that, in terms of the document, he acted "upon

instructions by the Roich Minister for Foreign Affairs."
However, in his arguiaent about his allegedly subordinate
capacity, he ooviously slips by sayings
"Furthermore, Ribbentrop himself didn't

decide on such trifles either; but, in connec
tion with such trifles even he went to Hitler
and aaked Hitler so as to make sure that ha

wouldn't expose himself to any subsequent

criticism on the part of Hitler." (Transcript
pages 11821, 11822).
The question arises whether Ribbentrop was considered

also on a level of hierarchy too low as to have been crimin-

ally responsible. The IMT decided otherwise. Moreover, vjas
it 'trifles" to give the instruction to Fabricius for a

diplomatic demarche with the Roumanian Prime Minister?
Attention is also called to another document, showing

the mportant role played by HITT^ in the Foreign Office's
actions going along with the troop concentrations in Rou
mania .

Refarenca is made to Prosecution Txh. 294. (i-G-^764),

Doc. Book 7-A, Fngl.

52,

This document contains the

-
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follovving passago in v.

's carrying not2 of 15

January 19^15 addrossod to V/aizsaockars
"The RAM (R-^ich For^igin Minister) rafars
to his talaphona talk v;ith Harr St'S. (Undorsocr7tary of St-to) and sands anclosod copy of
tha papar ramittod by G:jnaral Antonascu.
Ha
roqucsts to discuss i t vath tho compatont Harrang

RITT"^., Glodius, ./oaruiann,
(Undorlinings adaad).

/.Ridtelan and v/iahl,"

Of similar probativa affact is RITT1;R's ^alogram of
i-

16 January 194-1, Pros, Fxh. 298 „(HG-^76^?) Doc. B. 7-3,
^ngl. paga 5 at 6, raading^
"Tho
Forcos High Command sant
Ganoral Fialdmarshal List strictly confidantial
information for Gnuoral Antonascu by way of tho
/yohrniacht Mission in Bucharost, rogarding tho
total strongth of tho German troops 7:'hich will
march through Rouniania.

Should Ganoral Hanson

not havo submittod this inforiiiation to you
alroady, I raquost that you havo him inform you

of its contants,"

(Doc. Book 7-B, ^ngl. pago 6).

-
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®Participation jp_th6_Djplofliatic Ac^ioHj^ S6^ii^in^__
PTP^rnqn Troop Tr^sits;;;_through_Bi^g.aria .

One of the Foreign Office's diplomatic actions, parallel to the

inilitary preparations for Gerioany's participation in Italy's aggressive
war against Greece consisted in negotiations for Bulgaria's joining
the Tripartite Pact, thereby securing the possibility of German Army

transit t^pi'.ough Bulgaria. The defendant HITTER admitted tliis fact on

cross, although very reluctantly.

(Tr. page 124^7) • The following

documents,prove his involvement in that specific phase (Bulgaria)
of 'the Gerioan v/ar preparations against Greece.

In his memorandum of 2 January 1941^ Prosecution Exh. 299^ (NG—
3144, Doc.B:-. 7-B, Engl. page 8 at 9,10), RITTEH wa^te;

"For the__e3pected Visit of Jihe__Bi^^ari^_Pri^_Minisi^
I do not assume that the intention or the possibility

exist to confer with the Bulgarian Prime Ij-nister in detail
on military questions.

•

It is however necessary to p:opare th" ground for the
necessary military negotiations... liilitary negotiations
with Bulgaria at the earlie^t^pos^ible ^ment^ane above
all necessary for t7;o main questions:

l) For transit of our troops through Bulgaria. The initial
and preparatory negotiations are already being conducted
at present.

2)

The 0K?s7 wishes General Field liarshal List to conduct

these negotiations with the Bu3^arian Army High Command.

I therefore suggest that an agreement be reached v/ith
the Bulgarian Prime Liinister to the effect that soon after

his return direct military negotiations between Genera3.
Field I^arshal List and the Bulgarian High Command will
take place. A representative of the Foreign Office should
be attached to List's Oberkomiaando♦"

HITTER'S report to Ribbentrop of 23 January 1941, Pros.Ex. 36^6
(NG-553G, Doc. Bk.- 200, Engl,Page 49), reads:
"I have mentioned to General JodJ.,.,. that it would be

necessary during the Gerxaan-Bulgarian General Staff Con
ferences to malce certain concrete declarations to Bui-?

garia about the military protection of Bulgaria, espeea^y

against air attacks. This had been a prerequisite re-^

cognizsed by us for Bulgaria's joining the Tripartite
Pact, I have aslced General. Jodl to give a special order
'T' 4"5 *

in this respect to Field Harshal List# General Jodl
has agreed to this. He said for the salce of our omi
military interests (protection for our supplj'' routes
and the troops) "vts would have to see to it that the
anti-aircraft shou].d move into Bu3.garia ahead of the
German troops. He will point out this necessity to
Field liarshal List once more in connection -jith the
Tripartite Pact."

In vievf of the abovequoted text there cannot be any doubt about
the fact that HITTER in his suggestions to Jodl acted on liis own

initiativej in spite of his attempt on cross to obscure this clear
picture. (Transcript^ page 12494)•

Similarly revealing, esiDeciallj'" with regard to RITTSR^s important
role in influencing, the foreign policy in connection with BuD-garia,
corresponding to the military needs, is RITTJR^S memorandum of 27 -

January 194^-j Pros.Esdi. 300 (NG—3J97j Doc.Bk. 7~B, LngD.. page 22).
The text of this document starts v/ith the follov/ing paragraphs.

t

"During the next tvfo or three weeks, a number of

operations in the field of foreign policy ^

to

coincide and harmonize v/ith the military situation
and operations.

The operations__in the field of_foreign_policy
are as follov/sj

1. Renev/al of the Bulgarian-Turkish Hon-j^gression Pact,

^

2. Signing and publication of Bulgarians joining the
Trijpartite__Pact6

3. Apossibly more concise and formal declaration of
Germany's attitude to Turkey.

4. German diplomatic attitude to Grreece.

5. Yugoslavia joining the Tripartite Pact.

General Jodl can aupiiy final information with rega^
timing of mdaitary.oEerations oniy_after havii^ ®
Bruolanann,"General laiitary Attache in Sofia who

to him the minutes of the German-Bulgarian General Stall
conferences.
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For the present, General Jod?. has .^iven me the foUoV'/ing

inforiiiation on the subject ox time."
Vife turn to Pros.Jibdi.

3}

(NG-52S1, Doc. Bk. 200, S.p, 53)^ a

memorandum of Jodl, dated 29 JeJiuary 1941^ addressed "to the Foreign
Office for attention of Aiiibassador RJTTjJl" Its introductory passage
reads:

"The Fuehre*", after hearing toda3'''s reports, has made
the following decision vdth regard to the mdlitarj'operations in the Balkanss"
In paragraph 2 it states:

"2.)

The exact date of the entry into Bulgaria can

therefore not be foreseen at the present, but in all
probability it vdJ.l not be before 2J February,
The document v;as obviously one of those communications from the

High Command of the Army informing the Foreign Office through -RiTTiH,
about strictly, military plans to insure the oomdete coordination of

the military and political phases of o xjration "iiarita".
The defendant preferred to be evasive in his testimony on this

point (Transcript, page 12490)On 4 February 1941^ BITTER made a report to Rxbbentro, , reading:
"The Fuehrer's decision-of 28 January, concerning Bulgaria,
submitted to the German Foreign Ilinister, has been super

seded by the enclosed Fuehrer decision of 31 Januaiy vjhich
reformulates several points. This new Fuehrer decision

has not settled the question, raised j^^sterday, whether
the entry is to begin on 15 or 16 February." fPros

300, NG-3097, Doc.Bk. 7-B, Eiig].. page 22 at 26
3)

Paragraph 7 of the same dociuuent is an interesting confirraation of

the meaning of the phrase "training foimatlons", in the camouflage
vocabulary of the German Foreign Office, Iii that paragraph RITTER

writes;

"7- General Jodl desires to postpone, as far as^possible
disclosure of our real military objective. Thus it vrould
be preferable to avoid shovring our hand even when crossing

the Danube, lie suggests investigation of the possibility

of_j)rGtending for a \-iooli ^or tv/p to_have ^ont_trai^^£
for^tipjis ^so 'in the ca_se_of Bui^gariaj, on_the_invitation
_0ovo r nmont.

(Doc.Bk,'"7-B7 Engl. page" 24).

4) The "ne\v Fuehrer decision" appears in another part of the same
Exhibit (Doc.Bk, 7-B, ^ngl. page 27). It contains the passage:
"I ntend 0d attack against Greece to take place at the beginning of
Aprii.," illTTBR is on the distribution liso.
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Pros.lixh

303 (NG-3171) is a "mernQrandum of the second conference

held with the Ariiiy High Command (aCIO^ hist and representatives of the

Bulgarian General Jtaff", forwarded to RITTmR vd.th Admiral Burkner's

carrjrlng note of ^ February 1941 (Doc.Bk. 7-Bj Engl. page 42). It con
tains this significant heading:

"i'iinutes of the meeting held between representatives of
the RoyeJ. Bulgarian General Staff and t.-e German Supreiae
Command - Generalfeldmarschall List v;ith reference to

the problems arising from the jiotential pass^c_ _of__

German troop_s through Bulgariaj^ ^d the use of„thc. „atoyeinentioned troo£s_a^ainst_Grc_oce and possibly Turkey in the
event of military intervention by the latter," (Underlinings added).

According to the defendant HITTER (direct, page 11S2B), this was
"a classical example to show that Gonoral Staffs considered it to be
<5^

their duty to provide for all possible and impossible eventualities
and all thinkable and unthinkable happenings and to prepare theore

tical plans of operation for these eiuentualities." Ho also states:
"That was the impression I had upon reading these minutes
and this continues to be my impression even today be
cause many of these possible cases never juaterializod."
(Ibid).

However, the attack upon Greece did not prdve an "impossiblo
eventuality" nor the preparation thereof a "theoretical plan of operation,
. The next document, to be mentioned in t :.e present connection,

Pros.Exh, 305, NG-3821, Doc.Bk, 7-3, mngl.p. 51 at 52, is a memorandum

by HITTER, dated 24 February 1941- It- is important because it is one
of the numerous documents illustrating his top position,e.g. gxving

independent advico to foreign diplomatic representatives.

level

',/e next talce up a document showing the top policy/of RITTEE'S

position. Hoferonco is made to Pros.Hbch. 3691, (MG-52S7, ^oo.Bk. 200,
E,p. 61), a memorandum from PJTTiSH to Wcizsaeckor dated 10 February
1941, from which we quote:

"The Bulgarian ianister first came to sec me on Saturday
afternoon, ko told me that he could not malcc a fxnal
statement regarding the directive by the Supreme Commander
Colonel Popoff had not arrived as yet. ho said
thS''tho Bulgarian Government was in agroomont v/itt fee
suggested regulations but v/ajitod to ma.:o t® incidental

comlnts on it. Le.ter on the Reich Foreign

me to participate in his oonvorsacion with the Bulgarian
llinistor,"

-
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Pros<Bxh. 3694j (NG-t5238, Doc, Bk, 200, Iln-,!. pago 74) is the
transcript gf a discussion ho].d on 11 February 1941 between tho Chief
of the Foreign Section and Colonel Popoff of the Bulgarian Goncr-rJ.
Staff and contains this final passage:
"Ambassador RITTIIR v/as orally informed in advance."

We may finally mention Pros.Exh. 3^93j (NG-5236, Doc.Bk. 200,
Engl. page 70), a note from "Tarlimont, received by .HITTmk- on 10
February 1941. It contains thas higlily significant portion;
"A time-tablo submitted by the OIvl shows that the follovdng

operation may be submitted, provided favorable weather
Gxists:

Bridge construction 17
'1

February

Invasion on 20 February

attack on 3 April," (p,72)
Tho defendant could not conceal his embarrassment v/hon ho was

confronted vfith this document on cross (Transcript pages 12507, 12508)
However, ho soon recovered from Wiis shock, by moiling tho follovdng

bold statement, highly Eymptomatic of the utter lack of truthfulness
in his defense;

"No, those documents did not influence my rocollcction
about vdaat I said that namely,
that all wo were
concerned with was preparations for an oxpoctod irominont
attack from -England against Greece, even if tho -v/ord
'attack' is mentioned-on two occasions more that I

actually had remembered.,.,, I \7as absolutely convinced
at the time tho.t -.dthouta landing of the British in
Greece no part of tho Greek boundary v/ould have bGcn
transgressed by Geman troops and only for tliis reason,

namely, tho landings of the British troops on tho 3rd
of i.iarch and because of the previous other military

preparations, th^ Gorman political le.idorship saw itself
forced to, in a preventive manner and in a defensive
manner, to cross the Greek border. Th^iwas my attitude-,

'ihat v/as my conviction a'o the time and is still toy
conviction today." (Redirect

-
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page 12523)*

6»

HITTuK and tiia S&tcllitc; St!i:.t6 Iiunf;c.ry.

Tiio dooUi-iOnt ary evida;'.oa, sdows tnat RITT-jB. was
deeply involved in tiie diplo;j.atio pn&se of snotjissr
part of GePi-^any* s frantic preparations for ner aggres

sive war in tns Balkans, tnc Ger^^an troop transports
tnrougJi the satellite couiitry Hungary.

THe close

cooperation between tiae two aggressive war ir.struLiex^ts

of tne Eeicn, tne ^^ruy Hign ConLi^ai.d ar.d tne Foreign
Office nan be

clearly seen, witn RITTHR n&int-.inixig

tne liaison between tnei^.

Bros.Hxh. £7S,

illustration, we refer to

{l.G-2541, Dec.Bock 7-^*, j^ngl.page 56), a

docui-Lent consisting, of tnree secret telegrajns froie tne
tnen Ger^^an Minister to Hungary and defendant in tnis

case, Hrdi^annsdorf, respectively dated £4 and 27 Deceinbar 1940 and 18 January 1941.

Tne first one is address

ed to RITTjiik; eacn of tne two ctieers snow nii^ on tne
distribution list; tne second one also refers to. a pHcna
oonvarsation witii niiu.

THeir contei.ts ary self-

explanatory, and refute RITT-lR's bold statex^oiit oxi

direct, "I didrHt nave anytnin;, to do witn tne nanaling
of tne i..etter uyself**.'

Ha attex-pted to shroud tne

unu-lstakable facts witn a x.ist of alleged ignorance and

naivety at the

tiae. (Trar.script, page 11620).

v/e ^-&y also call attention to Pros.Hxh. £84

(NG-5190, Deo.Book 7-.., Hngl.page 67^ ,consisting of tnree
docui-ient s.

One is Ribbentrop* s top secret telegxa^^ to

tne Gorx^n legations in koscow, ..nkara, Belgrade -^rA
..tneas, dated 7 January 1941, wnich in part reads:
"ConfideXxtial inforo-x^tion for Gniefs
of the kissions and kilitatry ^.ttaones only.
The transport of strong Ger.xan tio op for;-&-

tions via'Kungary to Rom^enia has been under
way since tiie be^ixniing of January* Tho
-
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troop LLOvoi-Oiit is buiiig c^arrioc, out vjitii
tno full cousout of tiTiO iauugsrion and
Rou:_ani&n G-cvc:m^,^onts« Tno troops '.-Jill for
tne ti..o buing bo st&ticnoc. in tlio Scutb

of Kcuj.-&j.-ia, Tiio rj!-&on for tUos^ troop
^ovOi-^onts vjas tLc.t tno nocossity is soriousiy

boing conoidorod of turovjing tlio liiiiglisli ooi.^plot^ly out of Grooca." (Doo.Bcok; 7-.^, ^ngl;
pag-o 67) i

Tiio dcoUiiOnt carries a fiandvvritton indorsoL^ontj sigrod
by HITTjiK, tdo tsxt roads;

cordanoe witli discussiofi

y

Vr. von Richtiiofor in ac-

-

, again indicating RIlT^R^s

iiuportant role in tiio wnolo affair.

f

Ricftnofoii was tiio Gor^xan diolOx.-r.tic r^pr.
s--.xxt&tivo in Sofia.

-
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s_gc.ubla-Crc ssing of

Yuf 0 slav i a,

Part of tfio aocUi,..6rits, on 'wnicn tiia ll-iT based

its findings concorning tna aggression against Yufoslavis
were introduced in evidence in tne oresent case, Tney
include Pros.^xii. Po. 260 (P3-1671, Doc.Book 7-.., ,inrl,
page 4 at 5), tbe nlnutes of a conference at I-^itler^s

residence in Obersalzberg, between iiix.seif, Count

Galeazzo Ciano of the Pussolini GovernL.ant and Ribbentrop,
dated 12 ^^ugust 1939. Ve auote froi, this docui.ent;
speaking, it would be best

to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after

tne other.

This is fairly easily done, if

one xiXis partrer orotects the rear of the

other. Who is Just-finishing off one of the

uncertain neutrals,, and vice versa. Italy
i^y consider YuFoslavia such an ui".certain
neutral
Y^oslavia \;ould stay neutral

only as long as it would be dangerous to

side '.'Vhen
of tnethere
western
-*t? the xnD.xent
wouldde^^ocracies
be a turn ooenly.
to

the worse for Gernany and Italy, novi;<3Ver,
xugcslavia vuculd Join the ctner side coenly,

hoping thoreby to give natters a final"turn to
the aisadvantage of the ^.xis

"

^t the ti.^e of the abovo-x.^enticned Ritler-Ciano

i^'^eting, RlTTojh worked for Ribbentrop, on highly im
portant special pclitical nissions. Thus, belor^ng to
the inner circla of Ribbentrcp's toe-assistants, he was
certainly briefed or otherwise infcn.ed aocut Ger^^any's

intentions and pla*.nlngs concerning Yugoslavia, evez.
before his appointnant as Ribbentrop^s liaison nan with
the highest level of the hehrmacht in 1940.
He was kept informed about diplo-^atic mai.euvars

atte...pting to dc uble-cross Yugoslavia by persuading her
to support the aggressive war efforts of Ger_.-any. ^^t

this time, these afforts seeded to be ostensibly directed
re/'

<•

.
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only against &r-aoce, but witn tne secret second tiiou^Jit
of iiaving less difficulty in subjugating Yugoslavia,
1

•

upon Greece*s defeat,

^s an illustration, we refer to

ij.,

Pros.jxn, E7£ (iTG-34-04, Dcc.Boolc

oiingl.page 33), .

consisting of tnree docULionts respectively of 24

WM
W'

ivove^ber and 7 Bece.^ber 1940.

Tiioy indicate Ger^.an

diploi.^atic pressure upon Yugoslavia to violate iier neu
trality by allowing tne transit of Ger^.an war i^atericil

to i-i.lbania in support
Greece,

of Italy's aggressiye v^ar against

xiacn of tne tnree dooui^ents snows KITTBR on

tne distribution list.

PITTiiR's active cooperation as policy L-aker in

this kind of diploiVtacy for instance appears in Pros.

Bxh, 300 (l"G-3097, Dcc.Book 7-B, iiingl,pag3 22),

His

nenorandui. tnerein, of £7 January 1941, outlining cer

tain operations in tne field of foreign policy, wnicn ,
• • V.

t»s RITTj^B.'&u;^eSts, snould coincide and naruonize-witn

nilitary operations, nentions as Point 5:

• V

•

^Yugoslavia

i

joliiing tne Tripartite Pact,"

*.

Pros.ixn. 501 (KG-3167. Dsc.Book 7-B, Hngl,

page 31) is^cf a sii_ilar probative

effect. It con

tains a dcciL..erjt, dated 5 February 1941, neaded as'

"Lv.e^iOranauL. on conferei.oe in Foreign Office witn

1^-inister iiisen lonr acting for ^-.^^bassador PJTTHK in
tne presence of kinister Bensler and legation Council

lor 'Krai^arz".

It indicates as its subject ^atter

"Hail'transpar ts by way of Yugoslavia for operation
*karita'." ^motner part of this exhibit is a list
of war ^.aterials to be transported tnrougn Yugoslavia,
I

witn tnis nandwritten endorsei-iei.t by RITTojR, dated
I-.: •?

;L4 February 1941:

I'

"I don't T/vant to i^ke any suggestions
now, but would like to call a j^eeting as
soon as tna otner question is settled.'^
Finally, also included under this Exhibit nUi.:ber

is a carrying nota, dated 11 Larcti 1941, addressed to
RiTTiilR on benalf of Coin-Landing ^idniral Z, witn tiae fol'
lowing textJ

"In coiipliance witn your reouest of
today as expressed to xi.diniral Scimster we

forward to you in the enclosure for your
infor..-aticn a copy of tne order of Co^^-icind-

ing j^dniral Z, No,. 10341, top secret, for
officers only, of 6 karcb 1941, concerning
tbe use of tJie navy in Soutneast territory."
j^acn of^tne aforei-^entioned parts of Nxnibit 301

proves tne iij.portance of RITT-l^jR's role in coordinating

i-ilitary and diplomatic action in preparing tne Yugoslavia
pnase of operation 'Varita" wnen Geri^an troop transit
tnrougn Yugoslavia in support of tne attack against
Greece was planned.

RITTiijR rej^sined connected witn tne di plonetic

pnase of operation "iiarita", wnen its ciiaracter
cnanged after tne coup d'etat in Belgrade of 26 Larcn
1941.

Tne defendant RITTNR pleads witn regard to tne

tnereupon decided aggressive war against Yugoslavia, .
wnicn actually started on tne 6 ^ipril 1941, sii-ultaneously witn tne a.ttack against Greece:

"I exercised no activity, nor did
I

nave any knowledge of trie intentions

and decision®."

(Transcript, page 11641).

Nowevei*, tnere is proof to tne cor.trary, as appears froi..
tne following docu...ents snowing nia. on tne distribution
list:

ii^xn. 314 (1G-517Q) .Doc,Book 7-B, Nnfl.pefe 77

at 60,81; nxn. 516 (I Q-5247) , Deo.Book 7-B, i:.nf:l.page
^3cn. 519

(NG-5248) .Doc.Book 7-B, niifl.pago 68;

-
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xijXii. 5ic0 (l-.G—<^555) ,

Ijoc«.Book 7—B, jiin^l.psgG 90—n.;

•LjXii.

Doc.Book 7-3,' Bngl,page 92; j^xh,

o££ (KG--S6 95) ,

524, (l G-S09I) ) Dog,Book 7-B3 jiingL.page 96; .Jixn. 525'
{I a-5I26) , Doc.Book 7-B, iingi.page 100; ^xn, 526,

(KG-5I77) , Doc.Book 7-B, xjiigl.pagQ 102; Bxti. 528,
{NG-S085) ,
i

Doc.Book 7-B, Bngl.page 106,
illustration, wa i^ay single out tke first one

(jlxn.314), T^aiion is a top secret order of 29 LarcD

19^1, referring to the Foreign Officers participation

in tne jveJir;,iSckt propaganda cai-paign against Yugoslavia,
witn RITTnR on the

distribution list and also carrying

bis i n i t i a l s .

In cox^.enting tbereon during nis direct exai.i.
i^ation, the defendant stated:
"

actually tbere "vvas no reason

for baving tbese dociu,.ents sent to i.e, too,
but I can well ij-bgine tne reason wby tne
autnor of tne dccu..^nt navertn^less desired

to nav-j it trL^nSi^itted to x.e.

Proo&g.anda

questions were tne subject-^^tter.of an old

dispute betvJeen Ribbentrop and Keitel., and
between tne respective divisions of tne
Foreign Office and tne OKW. In order to
clarify or serve as a conciliator in sucn

discrepancies, Ribbentrop had repeatedly on
earlier occasions sent
to Keitel.
Ob
viously tne autnor of tne docui.ent knew —
nis ndi.e isn't snov;n on the docui^ent — ne
knew of i.„y repeated conciliation activities

between Ribbentrop and Keitel of earlier
tii.i.es, and tnerefore'ne sent i_e tnis docu.ent, too, ex'oecting _e, if any possible

new disputes or conflicts would arise, to
act as conciliator, so ne sent it to
in
any case.
Tnus at least I took it to be at
tne tio^o.
Tnerefora, I filed tiiis nei.io-

randui:. away in

own files, in order to

have it available on banc, in tbe ev^nt tbat

pursuant to tbat, Ribbentrop were to send
ue to Keitel to intervene in any conflict
arising, but tbis did not take place."

(Transcript, page 11640).

-
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Tills argument is obviously fictitious ixisofar as

it purports to cover RITT^K's relation to tiie specific
cacGUi-ieiits involved,

HoKever, it reveals the highly ii^-

portant function parfor^ied by hii. as policy coordinator
between Ribbentrop and Keitel,

(11^'
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RITT-iJR as'pMitlcal .-.dviser of tne
Hi^'Jri Cox.^.iar.d in i t s ?l&nnixgs of tlie
B&lktn Cai-O&ign.

RITTiiiH -was reluctant to openly adi^it tiiat iie

deputized Pdbbentrop by giving political advice to tbe
i^ruy Higii Co.ut_and in its plannings of tne Balkan canr

1.

paign'.

v/e quote froi- bis cross-exaLdnation:
nr.

WJaenevar a z^atter of political inport
ance -^rose in

connection "Witii

tbe

Liilitary planning of tbe Balkan cai^-

paign, Keitel i/vould contactj as a
natter of routinej eitber Ribbentrop
oj? yourself, -would be not?
«,s far as I

reneider Keitel never

turned to i_e at all»
lodl requested
ne repeatedly to cone and see bin.
Tbe initiative for conferences witb
Keitel or lodl also cane fron

Ribbentrop in alnost all instances,"

(Transcript, page 12486).

Ho-wever, tbe defendant's evasive statei_ents

c

cannot silence tbe clear language of the docui^ants.
illustration, we wisb to refer to Pros.Bxb. 311

(i\G-3i5^^, Doc,Book 7-B, Bngl.page 66), a top secret
Liez^oranduL. of 16 Karcb 1941, signed and initialed by
RJTTBIt, reading;
"General Jodl approacbed ue in tbe

following matter.

\/beri narcbing into Greece

it is necessary tbat a Gerj...an division should

uarcb along

tbe soutbern balf of tbe Greek-

Turkisn border, tbe reason being tbat tbis
IS tbe only road to Dedeagacb wbicb can be

used,

Tbey will however avoid tbe northern

balf of tbis border.

General lodl inquired

Whether it was necessary and expedient to

infon. tbe Turkish goverm.-ent of this natter,
I told bin tbat we were just in tbe course
of investigating tbe legnal position.

That to

ny knowledge there exis-ts a Greek-Turkish

ag;reei..ent concernir.g tbe railroad. Finally,
that I would let biLi have further infori^tion
as soon as we shall have investigated tbis
question."

-57

-

i-i

•;•*.'»

"V't;-!

This is not the language of a diploi^tio courier

but of an executive with a high degree of initiative and
independent responsibility.

5

1

-
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9.

RITTi:iK^ s

Cooparation "witii Weizsaeokor in the

LiplGi-^stio i^ctions Concerning the Balkan Canoaig.n.

RITTiilR v;&s also evasive vjhen a-sked

about his

cooperation with the defendant in this case, von

Weizsaecker,

V/e quote froL. his cross-exsi^ination in
V

the dipiouatic preparation of the Balkan aggressioni(fn

Once the Balkan campaign was

decided upon, you fully cooperated with

Weizsaecker in naking the necessary Foreign
Office preparations, did you not?
«

The preparations, you say?

I

don^t quite know what you Lieant to ii..ply,
Counsel . Vu'hat
von uean?
!;esn?" {Transcript,
Counsel.
Vi/nat do
do you
page 12490).

However, again the docuL.ents supply the clear

language which never was expressed by the defehdant.
illustration, we refer to that part of Exhibit 299

(NG-3144, Doc.Book V-B, Hhgl.page 6 at 19), which is a
top secret note of 15 lanuary 1941, signed by Weiz
saecker, addressed to and initialed by RITTHH, reading:
"For the ii^xbassador personally.
'SuppleL.enting the infori^ation contained

in telegraphic instructions No. 37 .and dealing

with the conferences here with Minister

Braganoff, I acquaint you with the following
however, are for your personal

^°5^-^'^i^^^^^ciuslvely.
^• garia

During his visit on

Braganoff first dealt with Bulforeign
political 'situation
question of joining the Three

Bo.'Ver Pact, Braganoff s rei^arks amounted

to this:^
To these rei^rks of Braganoff,
i replioQ verbally that concerning Bul^aria^s
erritorial ains 1 was in a position to inforix
hixu. that^ the Geman Governi^ent was in. agreox-ent
in principle that Bul^^aria shoula receive
^ocess to the ^xegean Sea, approxii^tely between
the nouths of the karica and the Stru..-a rivers.

Concerning the Three Power ?ac:t I told Braganoff
that^Bulgaria had to express its unreserved
Willingness to sign tne pact at Berlin at such
we snould see fit.

Gerx.xany would cnoose

the date for the signature at such a tii.xe as

woula enable us to cope with any possible
6velopi.xents. Braganoff accepted tnis infori..ation. "
-
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In iiis secret uei-oranduL- of 15 January 1941 -whicJi

is Exhibit 3684 (NG—5541_j Doc.Book 800, Engl.page 44),
RITTiiiR, upon piione instruction by Ribbentrop, supplied
v^eizsaecker TAiith directives for the further diploi^atio

negotiations with Bulgaria,
\<eizsaeoker reciprocated by sending RTTTjiR a

copy of his teletype i^essage of 15 January 1941 contain

ing his report to Ribbentrop on further negotiations

"With the Bulgarian minister;

Exhibit 3665 (FG-5286,

Doc.Book 200, Engl.page 47).
I

T

They surely did good tear.-Vvork in this uatter,
\<^eizsaecksr and RITTER,

both eagerly promoting the

criij-hal ains' of the Reich.

T-

-
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VI.

GOKCLUSION, VvlTH

TO TH.d JUDGIJ^^TTS IN

Tr^ HIGH COi.j.:uA\'D Ci>Sj2i n^T-D'H^

TH:ii Il-iT Ci^Siii.

V/e have reaciied tne end of our analysis of tne

evidence, linking tne defendant RITT£R VJitn tne cnarges
under Counts I

and I I of tne indioti^ent, . Tnis evidence

proves beyond any reasonable doubt tnat tne defendant
RITIuiH proLiOted and influenced tne aggressive war plans
and actions of tne Reicn.

few coL^ents nay be added concerning tne legal

probleLx involved, considering tne ludguent of kilitary

Tribunal V in the Kign OCi_a.^and Case (United States pf
iii-.erioa vs. \/iineljn von Leeb, et al).

On pages 30-39

of tnat opinion wnion aoplies a soi^evjnat novel approacn

to its discussion of tne legal requirei.ents for a con
viction on tne aggressive vjar cnarges, tne ei.pnasis is

placed upon tno question wnetner or not tne respective

V

defendant was "on the policy level".

On tnis basis,

4'
I

i.

the nigner officers wno were thei defendants in tnat

military case nave been acquitted by Tribunal V from
[>

tne aggressive war cnarges.

ML

It is not necessary, for tne present purpose,
to express any agreoL^ent or dis&greeL.ent witn tne legal

position expressed in tne Judgi.-ent of tne Hign Ooi^uand

Case,

Tne acquittal of tne Generals in tnat Case, even

on tne basis of tne legal reasoning accompanying it,
does not establish a ^'precedent witn regard to the
Foreign Office defendants in the present case and ea-.--

m

peoially witn regard to the defendant RITTj^R,. There
1

is enough evidence to distinguish the two oases and

especially to distinguish the case of the defendant.
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i.L.bassador for Special ii-ssignuents Karl RITTliH, under
Count III froi^ tii6t of tne Generals in-tne Eign Gou^nd
Case.

First, tiie task of officers, even of tke Jaignest

ranks, is not prinarily concerned vjitii policy naking,
wkereas diploi.iats priuarily and by tJae very nature of

tneir profession are^ supposed to be policy uakers.
Moreover and nore important, the evidence concerning the
defendant RITTEE's position and activities contains
auple illustrations of the fact that his position and

activities were that of a policy i^aker, especially in

his position as chief of the liaison between Foreign
Office and ±^ruy High Com^and^ end as Ribbentrop^ s right-

hand uan, being on the level of a St^te Secretary.
It is not surprising that RITTnPP s

conduct ties

in closely to cri^-iinal conduct found by the HIT in jts
discussions of the defendant Ribbentrop on the one
•«/

hand, and the conduct of Keitel and lodl of the High
Oow.and, on' the other hand.

By way of exai.ple we shall

quote one excerpt frou the H.,! judgj^ent concerning
Keitel and one frou the H.T judgi._ent concerning Ribbent
trop.

v;e shall then quote froi,_ a i^ei^orandoi^ of the

defendant RITTFR whicli shows his coordinating role in

the diplomatic and the military maneuvers involved in
aggression.

In the case of Keitel, the B.T held:

"Fori_al planning for attacking Greece and
Yugoslavia had begun in November 190. On
18 March 1941 Keitel heard Hitler tell Raeder ^

coi..plete occupation of Grcioce was a prerequisite
to settlGi,.ent, and also heard Hitler decree
Oh 27 Larch that the destruction of Yut,oslavis

should take place with ' ura-ercif ul harshness^ .

(p.289, Vol.i.)

-
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In tne case of Ribbentrop, tiie HviT IudgL_ent states:

'^Von Ribbentrop a'ttended tne Gonference on
20 January 1941, at wbicn Hitler and
Lussolini discussed tne proposed attack on
Greece, and tne conference in January 1941,
at wnicn h i t l e r obtained fron inatonescu

permission for German troops to go tnrougn
Roux^ania for tnis attack."
(P, 286 ,yol .1.)

January of 1941 Keitel informed RITThR of the

V

asgressive war steps to be taken in the Balkans.
Keitel told RITTiiR that tne date for the attack against

j

Greece was set for tne beginning of npril ai.d tnat tne

^

Geri^an troops snould enter Bulgaria at tne latest possible mOx_ent. Based on tnis conversation, jxuibassador
RITTmR proposed tne policy wnicn Ribbentrop and tne
Foreign Offj.ce snould now follow in order to coordinate

?

military and diplomatic acts in tne scneduled aggressions„ RITTHR^s own proposal for tne policy syncnronization reads:

0

"During tne next two or tnree weeks a nui_ber

of actions in tne field of foreign policy
nave to be_ tilled and coordinated'witn tne
military situation and tne, i^ilitary activi
ties..." (Pros.HXxi.BOO, NG-3097).

In tne sa^.e .^.eL^jrsLduL. RITTiilt capped out actions

•vnicii included tne renovation of tne Bulgarlsn-Turkisn
non-ageression pact, the entry of Bulgaria into tne
Portite Pact, and, an open statement of Geri,.an

i licy concerning Turkey. (Pros, jiixn, 300, 1-:G-3097 ,
loo.Book 7-B,

T'tis t-enorandun of RITTnlc, written in January
fori..ed tne policy wnicn snould be applied in pre
paration of the

ditack against tne Balkan countries in

-pril 1941.

-
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Do currents of tiais kind certainly prove tnat

defendant RITTiiiK "was "on a policy level" (in terL-s
of tne l"udgiaent in tne Piign Coi_Li_iand Case), and on a
level,

siiiilar in nany aspects to tnat of Eibbentrop

and Keitel in the IliT Case,

There cannot be any

doubt that his guilt appears established not only as
a

uatter of evidence but also as a

«

,v
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niatter of law.

VII»

PROPOSoiD FIkDIIvGS OF Fi.CT COFCauK-'IirG TKo R^SPCNSIBILITT OF THii; Dii:Fl!:'Dx.l\!T RITTFlH UI'TDiiR COUITTS
I

i-J:3 XI.

It is subuitted that tbe following facts nave been

establisned by tne evidence concerning tne defendant
RITT^R-^ s guilt under Counts I

?

1.

and II of tne indictment:

RITTnR participated in tne initiation

f invasions of otner countries and in tne initiating
nd waging of y;ars of

aggression in violation of

inter

national laws and treaties, and was connected witn plans
and preparations for aggression in tnat he wilfully and
knowingly;

(a)

took an active part in tne

Seizure of GzecnoSlovakia ;

(b)

took an active

pert in tne

diploi.-atic preparation of Geri.nny* s aggressive
wars against Greece, Yug-oslavia and Russia;

i

(c)

participated on a policy

making level in all tnoso activities, especially
in nis activities as Chief of tno Liaison between

tne Foreign Office and the ..n^y High Ooi.mand.

END
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